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Abstract 
Research Objectives: 
This study is aimed at understanding the influence of national cultures and the global mindset 
simultaneously on Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode choices in international markets. In order 
to address this problem, the study identifies the aspects of national cultures and the global mindset 
that drive the entry mode decisions in Finnish high-tech startups. In addition, the study aims to 
understand how these two factors influence the entry mode choices by describing in detail the 
reasoning process behind the decisions and the actual dynamics behind the entry modes chosen in 
the case companies. 
 
Methodology: 
This study is a qualitative multiple case study research. The empirical data for this research were 
mainly collected through five objective semi-structured thematic interviews with CEOs from five 
Finnish high-tech startups. The selected cases were prototypical ones with minimized exceptional 
features so that the findings can have the greatest generalizability. The informants were chosen for 
their thorough understanding of the companies’ business decisions. Additional information was also 
collected through the companies’ websites and blogs. The data were interpreted using different 
analysis techniques. 
 
Findings: 
The findings of this study show that national cultures and the global mindset simultaneously have 
impacts on Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode choices, but not in a linear pattern. It is suggested 
that differences in national cultures drove the case companies to choose contractual agreement as 
their entry mode even when the managers are internationally experienced in the target markets. The 
global mindset of the managers resulted in establishing wholly owned subsidiary even in culturally 
distant countries. Joint venture was not used and export was employed by only two of the case 
companies. The findings also suggest the important roles of product and industry specifics in 
Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode decisions. Product specifics that require confidentiality 
prevent the use of joint venture and partially lead to wholly owned subsidiary or export with the 
presence of national culture differences and the global mindset. Industry specifics that either 
facilitate direct meeting with customers or eliminate the need of face-to-face meeting also allow 
startups to use export as an entry mode. 
Keywords  Finnish high-tech startups, startup internationalization, international entry mode, 
national cultures, global mindset 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
During the past few decades, a new breed of firms that focuses on the innovativeness of 
products and/or business operation processes to search for profitable opportunities – 
startups – has been favored by the business world. Entrepreneurs are viewed as people 
sensing opportunities, taking risks and developing new products or services. It is firmly 
recognized that innovative startups are one of the main drivers for job creation and overall 
economic growth, which have relied heavily on big multinational conglomerates (OECD 
Observer 2000). Data show the importance of the birth of startups in job creation in the US 
from 1977 to 2005, during which time existing firms, large or small, continuously create 
and destroy jobs at the same time. Meanwhile “age-zero” firms – startups – create over 2-
3 million jobs even during recession time without any job destruction (Kane 2010). It is 
said that the rising of startups and their contributions to the world economy and dynamics 
are highly anticipated in the next decade. 
 
Moreover, it comes as natural to study startups in the context of Finnish economy since this 
is one of the small and open economies (SMOPECs) that is dependent on as well as 
facilitative for small and medium sized business (Luostarinen et al. 1994). In 2013, Finland 
was one of the world’s competitive and business friendly economies with a number of 
supporting systems for entrepreneurship and innovative enterprises such as Tekes, 
Finnvera, and so on. Simultaneously, Finland still remains among the innovation-driven 
economies in the world with regard to its business environment and general economic 
performance (Stenholm et al. 2013). Particularly within the recent 5 years, Finland has 
become one of the hottest startup hubs not only in Europe but also in the world, with the 
running of the annual “Slush” event for high-tech startups. Finnish high-tech startups are 
going even further by internationalizing their businesses to many physically and culturally 
distant countries such as China, Japan, Indonesia, Brazil, and so on.  
 
Considering the emergence and rapid internationalization of Finnish high-tech startups, I 
have taken my interest in the drives behind their taking-off. Starting from my own 
background in international business and cross-cultural issues, I have decided to take a 
cross-cultural lens to study this phenomenon. More details on the research problem are 
presented in the next section. 
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1.2. Research gap and research problem 
As globalization turns into a must over the last few decades, national cultures’ influences 
on business apparently becomes ever more crucial. A good understanding of cultural 
differences can facilitate smoother operations across national borders. Research on cross-
cultural management dates back to 1980s with Hofstede’s foundation of national culture 
dimensions. However, academic work focuses strongly on multinational companies’ 
intercultural operations, leaving entrepreneurship a less explored field for cross-cultural 
research. Cross-cultural entrepreneurship research falls into the discipline of international 
entrepreneurship, which is the crossing of international business and entrepreneurship 
(McDougall and Obviatt 2000; Keupp and Gassmann 2009) and strategic management 
(Rouddini and Osman 2012). Despite increasing academic interest in international 
entrepreneurship, the research area remains in its infancy with rather fragmented content 
and a lack of methodological unification (Coviello and Jones 2004; Coviello, McDougall 
and Oviatt 2011). Culture as one of the influencing factors on entrepreneurial behaviors is 
little discussed in the field (Jones, Coviello and Tang 2011).  
 
International entrepreneurship is a relatively new promising area for academic research. 
The foundation of the field can be traced back to approximately 3 decades ago with 
McDougall’s study of new ventures in technology in the US that thrive for international 
competition at a large scale and high speed (McDougall 1989). Until 2000, the field’s focus 
remains mostly on high-tech startups’ operation and internationalization, particularly with 
less attention to the early stages of the internationalization process (Keupp and Gassmann 
2009). Entry of high-tech startups into global market is among the first 3 stages of their 
development (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 2006). It has been proved that an entry method 
can have decisive effects on the internationalizing startup’s success in the specific market 
later on (Hill, Hwang and Kim 1990; Melén and Nordman 2009). Moreover, many studies 
have shown that international entry modes are affected by the national cultures of home 
and host countries (Pan and Tse 2000; Dwyer, Mesak and Hsu 2005; Ojala and Tyrväinen 
2007). However, since it is still argueable if national cultures have impacts on born-globals’ 
international entry mode choices (Perks 2009), it is worth looking at this problem in the 
context of Finland – one of the startup hub of the world. 
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In addition, the global mindset is also one of the major prerequisites to succeed in 
international business, particularly towards small and medium sized companies. This has 
been proved with empirical data in extant research (Nummela, Saarenketo and 
Puumalainen 2004). The concept of global mindset could also be seen as rising with the 
advent of globalization when companies attempted to go internationally quickly since the 
last decade of the twentieth century. A number of researches have been dedicated to 
proposing an appropriate definition for the concept (Kedia and Mukherji 1999, Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2002). Accordingly, a global mindset combines the elements of openness to 
and awareness of diversity across cultures, accompanied with an inclination and ability to 
handle it (Gupta and Govindarajan 2002). Going beyond this, Levy et al. (2007) reviewing 
main research streams on the global mindset consolidate its characteristics including the 
two above and a complex combination of cultural and strategic dynamics, which explicitly 
confirms those features. Current research has stated that the global mindset is an antecedent 
at the managerial level of startups’ and small and medium-sized enterprises’ 
internationalization process (Nummela, Saarenketo and Puumalainen 2004, Miocevic and 
Crnjak-Karanovic 2012).  
 
Considered as part of small and medium sized firms, high-tech startups also observe large 
impacts of the global mindset on their internationalization and success. However, startups 
is different from traditional small and medium sized companies in that their business are 
scalable. With startups taking off, the scope of the global mindset’s impacts can be 
dramatically accelerated. In the light of the multiple cultures perspective, I assume that the 
global mindset implies one shared culture among high-tech startups (Sackmann and 
Phillips 2004). In that case, the clash of cultures is no longer just among nations (i.e. at the 
macro level), but rather among different cultural levels. Then, one thought-provoking idea 
is whether national cultures are still influential with the emergence of a shared culture like 
the global mindset. The studying of the influence of national cultures together with the 
global mindset on internationalizing high-tech startups becomes essential. Captivated by 
this question, I engaged myself in this research. This thesis is dedicated to this phenomenon. 
 
Moreover, firm’s entry mode choice is very important to its future success in the market 
(Brouthers 2002, Chen and Hu 2002). Although a large number of researches have touched 
the topic of small firms’ internationalization, my study goes a step further into details about 
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influences on firm’s entry mode choice and is aimed to make contribution to this specific 
aspect. This study also takes a less used methodology in this field, using the qualitative 
multiple case study research design to approach this research problem. With this 
methodological approach, my study is expected to contribute to theory building process in 
the field. 
 
1.3. Research objective and questions 
The study’s objective is to investigate how national cultures and the global mindset 
influence Finnish high-tech startups in their choices of international entry modes. Within 
its scope, my study is aimed to tackle 2 research questions: 
a) What aspects of national cultures and the global mindset are important to the entry 
mode choice in Finnish high-tech startups? 
b) How do these factors influence the entry mode decision? 
The study follows the qualitative research method in order to achieve its objective. The 
research questions are addressed through an empirical investigation of 5 Finnish high-tech 
startups. To be specific, objective semi-structured thematic interviews are carried out with 
the case companies’ CEOs, with each lasting approximately 1 hour. The number of 
questions for the interviews is subject to change for each case. However, the questions are 
developed on the same themes which are based on the extant literature review on the 
research problem. Additional minor information is also collected through the companies’ 
websites ad blogs. The data are analyzed by using different techniques and the research 
questions are tackled thereon. 
 
1.4. Definition 
To clarify the literature domain for building up the theoretical framework for this study, it 
is essential to put forth one unified understanding for the term “high-tech startup” to be 
used in this study. 
High-tech startup 
The term “start-up” is defined by Blank and Dorf (2012) as “not a smaller version of a large 
company” but “a temporary organization in search of a scalable, repeatable, profitable 
business model” (p. xvii). In addition, as “high-tech startups” that go for international 
competition will be studied, the term’s definition would be close to that of “international 
new ventures” or “born-globals” operating in the industry of high technology products or 
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services. These terms are more or less used interchangeably in current research (Jolly, 
Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992, Kuivalainen, Saarenketo and Puumalainen 2012; Cannone and 
Ughetto 2014). However, for the purpose of this research, I believe that the term “high-tech 
startup” best describes the type of firms studied in this thesis (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 
1992). 
 
These terms could be possibly defined by many criteria such as years of age or firm’s size 
but the focus is on firm’s intention to be global market players from inception (Oviatt and 
McDougall 1994, McDougall and Oviatt 2000, Zahra and George 2002). However, Oviatt 
and McDougall (1997) suggest that since it is not a popular practice to observe the inception 
of these firms, they can be defined as firms that have observable foreign commitment like 
sales efforts or investments. Moreover, although many selections for the particular period 
during which startups internationalize are still open to be discussed (McDougall et al. 1994, 
Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992), the period of 6 years at the beginning can be considered 
the formative phase of new ventures (The State of Small Business 1989, cited in Oviatt and 
McDougall 1997). Therefore, the term “high-tech startups” in this study will refer to firms 
in the industries of high technology that attempt to internationalize to other markets than 
their home countries within 6 years of establishment in search of scalable, repeatable and 
profitable business opportunities (Oviatt and McDougall 1997, Blank and Dorf 2012). 
 
The next chapter is reserved to examine research done in the related academic fields and to 
construct a theoretical framework for this study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an appropriate theoretical framework for the 
empirical investigation following in the next chapters. This is done by examining academic 
works mostly in the field of international entrepreneurship. The chapter starts with an 
overview on the international entrepreneurship field – existing studies and research trends. 
In addition, researches on the internationalization process of both traditional and small and 
medium sized companies will be presented and compared, followed by entry mode studies. 
The chapter then introduces studies on national cultures and the global mindset and findings 
about their influences on entry mode decisions. At the end of this review, I propose a 
preliminary theoretical framework as the base for the data collection, analysis and 
discussion later on in this study. 
 
2.1. The field of international entrepreneurship 
The idea of international entrepreneurship dates back to late 1980s, marked with 
McDougall’s research in 1989, in which the author attempts to show the differences 
between new ventures that compete domestically and internationally. Employing a survey-
based quantitative research methodology, with empirical data from manufacturers in 
telecommunications in the US, she has put forth some key aspects differentiating new 
ventures operating internationally from domestic ones, such as distribution and marketing 
strategy, international competition magnitude, entry strategies, and so on. Despite the 
infancy of international entrepreneurship, starting with drawing the boundaries of 
internationalizing high-tech startups, the research has opened up a new path for researchers, 
intertwining the two fields of international business and entrepreneurship, calling for 
further observation, description and explanation of the phenomenon. (McDougall 1989) 
 
After this perceived foundation of the field, more and more studies have been conducted 
developing the definition of international entrepreneurship further beyond the operation of 
high-tech startups. Both conceptual and empirical studies have contributed to the 
development of the field; the definition of international entrepreneurship has thus been 
through major changes (McDougall 1989, Zahra 1993, Oviatt and McDougall 2000, Zahra 
and George 2002, Oviatt and McDougall 2005). This section and its sub-sections are 
dedicated to review the evolving process of the field, thus positioning the present study in 
the field. 
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2.1.1. International entrepreneurship definition 
The term of “international entrepreneurship” was first explicitly mentioned by McDougall 
as “the development of international new ventures or startups that, from their inception, 
engage in international business, thus viewing their operating domain as international from 
the initial stages of the firm’s operation” (McDougall 1989, p. 387). The notion of 
international entrepreneurship is also supported by her empirical research of 188 new 
venture firms in telecommunications in the US. 
 
Research did evolve over time to include examining those entrepreneurial activities carried 
out by large established multinational enterprises, thus bringing up the idea of “corporate 
entrepreneurship” (Zahra 1993). Particularly, McDougall and Oviatt (2000) have formally 
introduced international entrepreneurship as the crossing of international business and 
entrepreneurship research, defining it as “a combination of innovative, proactive, and risk-
seeking behavior that crosses national borders and is intended to create value in 
organizations” (p. 903). The authors also emphasize the irrelevance of firm’s size and age, 
stating clearly that studies in the field include both the entrepreneurial internationalization 
and the comparison of domestic entrepreneurial behaviors among countries (McDougall 
and Oviatt 2000). 
 
In response to calls for research in international entrepreneurship during 2000s, in Zahra 
and George (2002), the concept of “opportunities” was introduced along with international 
entrepreneurship. To be specific, international entrepreneurship is considered to be “the 
process of creatively discovering and exploiting opportunities that lie outside a firm’s 
domestic markets in the pursuit of competitive advantage” (p. 262). This definition 
however does not touch the aspect of comparison of domestic entrepreneurial behaviors 
among multiple countries. Instead, Zahra and George (2002) focus on realization and 
exploitation of opportunities overseas and the creativeness of those activities that literally 
equates entrepreneurial internationalization (Coviello, McDougall and Oviatt 2011). 
 
The multi-domestic entrepreneurship comparison is once again included in the coverage of 
international entrepreneurship research along with the idea of innovatively recognizing and 
exploiting opportunities by Oviatt and McDougall (2005). The authors think that 
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international entrepreneurship is “the discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities – across national borders – to create future goods and services” (Oviatt and 
McDougall 2005, p. 540).  
 
Although Oviatt and McDougall (2005) focus on the aspect of “across national borders” 
which means covering both the above-mentioned sides, the definition appears to display 
the phenomenological rather than theoretical approach to the definition of international 
entrepreneurship. This in turn leads to literature exclusively focusing on analyzing small 
young firms’ tendency to internationalize, their international performance and demographic 
and entrepreneur’s cognitive features. However, the closest definition to international 
entrepreneurship should be studying “the early stages of any process where the 
entrepreneurial aspects of internationalization come to the fore” (Keupp and Gassmann 
2009, p. 603). This definition is also chosen for this study since it focuses on constructing 
the boundaries for the field, opening up room for studies either existing sub-fields, i.e. 
entrepreneurial internationalization, comparison of domestic entrepreneurial behaviors in 
many countries, internationalization of small new ventures and internationalization 
processes executed by multinational enterprises. Moreover, the definition also covers 
possible future research or phenomena emerging regarding the internationalization process 
and its “entrepreneurial-ness” that do not fall under the umbrella of the above existing sub-
fields. In other words, the definition not only managed to position international 
entrepreneurship in the intersection of international business and entrepreneurship, as it 
should be but also realized international entrepreneurship as a theoretically legitimate field 
whose study goes beyond international business and entrepreneurship in general. (Keupp 
and Gassmann 2009) 
 
2.1.2. Major research streams in international entrepreneurship 
This section is dedicated to look at the existing literature in international entrepreneurship. 
As mentioned above, since the field is still in its very infancy phase, studies, especially 
empirical ones, are rather fragmented despite some dominating trends in international 
entrepreneurship. Hence, it is useful to go through some review papers to have an overview 
of the field. I will then position my study basing on my research objectives. 
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In a recent research, Jones, Coviello and Tang (2011) conduct a thematic analysis of 
researches in international entrepreneurship in the 20-year period of 1989-2009. Content-
wise speaking, the authors point out three major categories of research in the, which are 
(A) entrepreneurial internationalization, (B) international comparisons of entrepreneurship 
and (C) comparative entrepreneurial internationalization field (Figure 1). This 
classification can be seen as the closest one that follows the definitions proposed in 
previous researches. While the two former categories derives from the definition of 
international entrepreneurship by McDougall and Oviatt (2000) and Oviatt and McDougall 
(2005), the third one is an emerging trend in international entrepreneurship research which 
focuses on comparing cross-border entrepreneurship throughout different countries and 
cultural contexts. As can be seen from Figure 1, most of existing studies are concerned with 
entrepreneurial internationalization, looking at different kinds of ventures and their 
internationalization. Next come a number of researches in international comparisons of 
entrepreneurship, which look at cross-country and cross-culture issues in entrepreneurship. 
There are not many researches in the new branch of comparative entrepreneurial 
internationalization that includes studies on comparing internationalizing high-tech 
startups across different countries, mostly exploring knowledge-intensive firms that base 
themselves on high technology. (Jones, Coviello and Tang 2011)
    10 
Figure 1. Thematic map of the international entrepreneurship domain 1989-2009 
(Jones, Coviello and Tang 2011, p. 636)
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While Jones, Coviello and Tang (2011) take the country borders and the 
entrepreneurialness of firms as the criteria for reviewing, Keupp and Gassmann (2009) shift 
their focus to the components of the internationalization process. The authors group 
existing studies, starting with antecedents of international entrepreneurship, leading to its 
elements and consequently its outcomes (Figure 2). According to the authors, researches 
are dedicated to many different concerns in the field. They include the influence of the 
antecedents on the elements (Arrow 1), the influence of the elements on the outcomes 
(Arrow 2), the influenc of the antecedents on the outcomes (Arrow 3), the influence of 
between the elements (Arrow 4). According to Figure 2, the largest number of studies 
concentrates on the influence of international entrepreneurship’s antecedents on 
internationalization pattern/degree/extent (120 studies). Meanwhile, very few studies focus 
on the entry mode choice (only 8 studies).  (Keupp and Gassmann 2009) 
Figure 2. Organizing framework derived from content analysis of the literature and 
counts of the most frequent topics treated therein 
(Keupp and Gassmann 2009, p. 605) 
While the two observations above are made content-wisely, there is a methodological 
division in international entrepreneurship research. A large number of researches in 
international entrepreneurship adopt the quantitative research method, mostly survey-based 
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research, while the qualitative research method is less employed (Coviello and Jones 2004, 
Keupp and Gassmann 2009). According to Coviello and Jones (2004), less than a quarter 
of the researches adopt qualitative as their primary research method. It means that 
researches in the field are mainly concerned with measuring numbers and hypothesis 
testing, thus predicting future incidents through predetermined assumptions and sets of 
variables. This, in turn, seems not reasonable for researching such a newly emerging field 
that requires investigating behaviors varying context by context (McDougall and Oviatt 
2000). Therefore, it is highly suggested that future research should focus on explaining the 
phenomenon rather than purely recognizing it (Jones and Coviello 2004).  
 
From the above discussion and my study’s objectives, this study can be seen as falling 
under the research branch of entrepreneurial internationalization, with the focus on 
influences on internationalization in particular (Figure 1), and the influence of international 
entrepreneurship’s antecedents on its outcomes (Arrow 3 in Figure 2). Although these are 
both dominating trends in the extant research, my study goes a step further into details 
about influences on entry mode choice and is aimed to make contribution to this specific 
aspect. This complies with Keupp and Gassmann’s (2009) encouragement for further 
knowledge about the entrepreneurship-driven phases (usually at the beginning) of the 
internationalizing process. Moreover, this study adopts the qualitative research method, 
using the multiple case study research design and objective semi-structured interview for 
collecting data. Thus, it is expected to contribute to theory building process in the field. 
Next, I will compare the internationalization process in both the traditional way and the 
way favored by high-tech startups, then discuss different types of international entry modes 
and current research in international entrepreneurship about entry mode choices. 
 
2.2. The internationalization process 
2.2.1. Existing approaches to the internationalization process 
The internationalization process has long been studied in traditional types of firms. 
Recently, many researches have also been dedicated to this process in small and medium 
sized companies and startups. In this section, a comparison of the approaches to the 
internationalization process is provided, followed by the introduction of international entry 
mode and its meaning towards firms’ success in foreign markets. 
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The traditional internationalization approach 
The traditional internationalization approach is one of the dominating theory in existing 
international business literature. It has been the foundation for plentiful studies in the 
research of the process during which firms internationalize their operations to one or many 
foreign markets other than their home markets. The traditional approach is generally 
attached to the stage model of internationalization, or the Uppsala model, presented by 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977). 
 
The stage model of internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) focuses on firms’ 
incremental market knowledge acquisition and integration in their international operations, 
during which firms gradually increase their market commitment or resources committed to 
foreign markets. Basically, when a firm is relatively new to a certain foreign market, 
meaning it has little knowledge of the market, it will perceive that market as presenting 
more risks than opportunities, thus decides to invest only a small amount of its resources 
in the market. For example, firm uses less resource demanding modes such as exporting, 
franchising, and so on to make first moves into the target market. As firm continues its 
initial operations in the market, it gradually acquires more knowledge, leading to less 
uncertainty about the market. As a result, firm makes adjustments in its current operations 
so as to increase the amount of time, money and human resources in the market. It will 
consequently be prone to highly-committed modes such as representative office, wholly 
owned subsidiary, or manufacturing factory. The model emphasizes that additional 
commitments have to occur in small steps. However, this might be not the case for firms 
with plentiful resources, foreign markets with very stable and homogenous features, and/or 
firms with much experience from similar markets.  (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) 
 
The original traditional model however maintains that the main reason for a firm’s 
uncertainty in a foreign market is the psychic distance between its home and host market 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Due to major changes in economic and regulatory 
environments, as well as firms’ behaviors, the authors have made some adjustments to the 
original model, integrating the network perspective in reviewing (Johanson and Vahlne 
2009). The revisited model, or the business network model of the internationalization 
process, poses the idea of liability of outsidership, which implies the root of uncertainty 
lies in the state of being an outsider in a business network. To be specific, firm is perceived 
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as always operating in a business network and internationalization is purely firm’s attempt 
to strengthen its network position (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). 
 
Despite the other model – the innovation related internationalization model (Bilkey and 
Tesar 1977), the Uppsala internationalization model has gained in popularity in 
international business literature perhaps because of its applicability to a wider range of 
firms, not limited on foreign activities and firm sizes (Oviatt and McDougall 1997). 
However, the model also shows its drawbacks when applied to internationalizing high-tech 
startups which emerged in a great number during 1990s (Oviatt and McDougall 1997). 
Next is the accelerated approach of internationalizing high-tech startups.  
 
The accelerated internationalization approach 
In her foundation setting research for the field of international entrepreneurship in 1989, 
McDougall proves that startups in telecommunication industries in the US usually choose 
to start their international operations with highly-committed modes at a large scale 
(McDougall 1989). Along with proposing the initial definition of international 
entrepreneurship, McDougall (1989) also brings up a need for substantially reviewing the 
applicability of the traditional internationalization model. Following that, Oviatt and 
McDougall (1997) call for further study of a pervasive phenomenon named the accelerated 
internationalization process, which appears to accompany with the birth of 
internationalizing high-tech startups. 
 
Many studies suggest that startups do not internationalize in the shadow of the stage models 
(Bell 1995, Madsen and Servais 1997), at the same time highlighting a unique approach to 
internationalization called accelerated internationalization process (Chetty and Campbell-
Hunt 2004, Weerabardena et al. 2007). The main idea of the accelerated internationalization 
approach is that startups internationalize rapidly with a large extent of commitment 
simultaneously into multiple markets with intense competition. This rapid 
internationalization happens simply because it brings benefits to startups rather than posing 
risks to them. According to Oviatt and McDougall (1997), internationalizing startups might 
need to seek invaluable resouces like human resources while minimizing the cost they have 
to pay. Therefore, going to any part of the world where these resources are available 
actually turns into a strategy. Moreover, founded by internationally experienced 
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entrepreneurs, these startups usually serve niche fast changing markets. Consequently, 
startups’ fast responses are required for good business performance. 
 
Comparison of firms following the two approaches 
In order to provide an overview of both internationalization approaches, Rialp et al. (2005) 
have based on three dimensions: founder’s attributes, organizational competences and 
firm’s strategic focus. Regarding founder’s attributes, the vision, international experience, 
commitment and network of firm’s founder or founding team are taken into account. 
Internationalizing high-tech startups’ founders usually aim at internationalization from day 
one. They are often familiar with international exposure in previous assignments, thus 
having a broad network of critical contacts and being very committed to early 
internationalization. Meanwhile, traditional firms do not score high in all these criteria. 
Their managers are not very well-equiped with previous international experience and have 
a rather loose network of business leads. Their commitment to internationalization is at a 
general level and gradual internationalization is an acceptable target. (Rialp et al. 2005) 
 
In regard to organizational competences, firm’s intangible assets, market understanding 
and commitment, and value creation sources are evaluated. In high-tech startup’s position, 
thanks to founder’s international expertise, firm owns valuable knowledge management 
processes, which enables high commitment to internationalization since the beginning. 
Knowledge-intensive product is also expected in this type of firms. On the contrary, 
gradualist firms do not seem to possess these attributes. Their knowledge is built up slowly 
and less critical intangible assets are available. In addition, traditional firms tend to provide 
basic products with less product differentiation, which is less favorable for them in the 
global market. (Rialp et al. 2005) 
 
As regards firm’s strategic focus, Rialp et al. (2005) consider the magnitude of firm’s 
international strategy, the customer strategy and the strategic flexibility. For high-tech 
startups, the focus is on a niche market with active involvement in market development 
around the globe. Customers are also chosen carefully and approached directly. Moreover, 
all strategies are kept as flexible as possible to react quickly upon changes. Meanwhile, 
traditional gradualist firms rather aim at popular markets, first entering less psychically 
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distant ones, relying on foreign intermediaries for customers. Their strategies are also quite 
rigid and less subject to change. (Rialp et al. 2005) 
 
On the other hand, there are researches proving that the accelerated approach does not differ 
from the traditional stage model as much as the model suggests. Chetty and Campbell-Hunt 
(2004) involving case in-depth research with 16 New Zealand companies report that in both 
approaches, many phenomena appear to be the same for high-tech startups and traditional 
firms in the beginning phase of the internationalization process. This however might not be 
the case as firms develop further into global markets. In the latter phases in the process, 
high-tech startups grow as the accelerated model predicts, i.e. they are led to enter multiple 
markets quickly, focus on niche markets, and extensively utilize their network of business 
partners. Chetty and Campbell-Hunt (2004) therefore conclude that the accelerated 
internationalization is not a new phenomenon, instead it comes naturally and relevantly to 
compete in global market as a result of the transformation of the global economic system.  
 
In a similar vein, Gabrielsson and Pelkonen (2008) conduct a case study research with 3 
Finnish companies in digital media. These companies are characterized by rapid 
establishment to distant countries and their skip of the non-investment production operation 
modes to directly move to sales subsidiary followed by several acquisitions of production 
units. However, after the business crises in 2000 leading to these firms’ withdrawals in the 
industry, the way they internationalized is more similar to what the stage model of 
internationalization would suggest. Thus, it is concluded that the internationalization 
patterns of high-tech startups follow different models depending on the investigation 
period, especially after an economic slow down. This view is also shared by Fan and Phan 
(2007) comparing new ventures in airline industry across European countries, which 
suggests that many non-born-global firms had the same features as internationalizing high-
tech startups but did not opt for early internationalization. 
 
From these contradicting findings, it can be seen that firms in their early stages of the 
internationalization process tend to show the entrepreneurial characteristics in their 
movements and benefit the most from these activities (Keupp and Gassmann 2009). Thus, 
regardless of what breed of firms they are, traditional or startup, new or transformed from 
traditional ones, it is possible to observe some deviations from the traditional stage model 
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in their internationalization process. Going beyond both models discussed above, some 
firms even employ 2 to 3 modes of international market entry at the same time rather than 
changing one by one over time (Perks 2009). This suggests that the two internationalization 
models are not necessarily mutually exclusive in a firm’s internationalization. On the 
contrary, they can be applied in different time period or even simultaneously in seeking the 
most benefits for their international operations. Next is the extant research on international 
entry mode. 
 
2.2.2. International entry mode 
The definition of international entry mode is rather straightforward. In general, it is 
understood as the way that internationalizing organizations use to operate their business in 
foreign markets (Welch, Benito and Petersen 2007). International entry mode is among the 
elements that have the greatest impact on the success of firms’ operation in international 
markets (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). Decision makers usually favor the modes that 
enable highest return on investment after evaluating and mediating all possibly observed 
risks. Entry modes also go hand in hand with the degree of control that they can entitle the 
internationalizing firms. According to Anderson and Gatignon (1986), the degree of control 
is concerned with firms’ ability to influence the overseas business operations and decisions. 
However, higher degree of control also means higher level of risks, as firms have to bear 
the responsibility to make decisions, commit more resources and thus become more 
exposed to unfamiliar business environments. In compensation for that, return is expected 
to rise. On the other hand, less control helps reduce risks at the expense of returns. The 
classifications of international entry modes thus also surround the idea of risk, return and 
control (Anderson and Gatignon 1986).  
 
In general, the current classifications of international entry modes are largely based on the 
idea of control that is discussed above. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) suggest grouping 
entry modes into 3 groups with descending level of control respectively: dominant equity 
interests (wholly-owned subsidiary, dominant shareholder), equitable interests (equal 
partner, contractual joint venture, contract management, franchise, etc.) and scattered 
interests (non-exclusive non-restrictive contract, small shareholder). Pan and Tse (2000) 
divide these modes into 2 categories of equity and non-equity modes (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. A hierarchical model of choice of entry modes 
(Pan and Tse 2000, p. 538) 
In a similar vein, Welch, Benito and Petersen (2007) suggest 3 groups of entry modes: 
contractual (franchising, licensing, management contracts, etc.), exporting (i.e. distributor, 
sales office/subsidiary) and investment modes (minor/major share alliance, wholly owned 
factory). While this could be seen as another way of classification since it provides a more 
focused perspective on firms’ investment, it still finally comes down to firms’ level of 
commitment, thus their control over their overseas business units. Therefore, in this study, 
the classification of entry modes as shown in Figure 3 will be used. The classification will 
be understood in this study as non-equity modes allowing low resource commitment and 
low level of control for internationalizing firms and equity modes showing high level in 
both criteria (Pan and Tse 2000). 
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Research show that there are many options for predicting entry mode choices in 
internationalizing high-tech startups. Rennie (1993) suggests that products’ unique know-
how usually seen in high-tech startups tends to let them choose highly involved modes to 
avoid knowledge exposure. On the other hand, startups lack tangible resources, especially 
financial resources, which leads them to logically favor less committed entry modes. 
However, these choices mainly result from constraints, which are substantially based on 
the traditional stage approach to internationalization. They can possibly be constructed by 
many other factors, for instance the national environment of startups’ home and host 
countries (Efrat and Shoham 2013). 
 
With regards to factors influencing startups’ entry mode choices, Ripollés, Blesa and 
Monferrer (2012) conduct a survey-based study of 537 Spanish internationalizing startups 
from several industries. The authors propose that early international entry and 
entrepreneurial orientation can affect startups’ international market orientation, thus lead 
to choosing higher committed entry modes for their operation in international markets. 
Hessels and Terjesen (2010) research of 871 Dutch SMEs and suggest that SMEs might 
favor direct export mode if their home markets offer low perceived production costs and 
provide them with accessible knowledge and technology. Using a multiple case study 
approach, Melén and Nordman (2009) conduct a longitudinal study and conclude that high-
tech startups choose both high- and low-committed modes depending on the perceived 
importance of the target markets, without following either the traditional stage model of 
internationalization or the accelerated model.  
 
In a similar attempt, Nakos and Brouthers (2002) come to conclusions that small companies 
tend to choose equity modes of entry when they possess differentiated products, enter high 
potential market, and/or perceive high international advantages. Brouthers and Nakos 
(2004) in addition show a link between national cultures and small enterprises’ entry modes 
in that they opt for equity modes when perceiving target market uncertainties as low. With 
an orientation towards new venture type of firms, Perks (2009) adds more factors 
influencing entry mode decisions of European firms (France, UK, Italy and Germany), 
including entrepreneurs’ personal preference and mindset, national cultures, product nature 
and so on. In this research, I keep the focus on national cultures and the global mindset that 
are predicted as two factors influencing Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode choices. In 
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the next section, I will review existing research on each of these factors and their influences 
on international entry mode choice. 
 
2.3. Cultural distance 
2.3.1. The national cultures perspective 
The notion of national cultures was first introduced by Geert Hofstede in 1980s. This was 
based on a large-scale research project that the author conducted in 50 countries with over 
116,000 answers to questionnaires (Hofstede 1983). Accordingly, the differences among 
national cultures in the world are summarized in 4 dimensions, which include power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism – collectivism, and masculinity – 
femininity. These dimensions, often referred to as the national culture dimensions, have 
close relationships with many basic problems of any human societies. They provide tools 
to explain the different solutions that each single society could come up with for their 
problems. More specifically in organizational settings, these dimensions are useful in 
organizational structures and human resources’ issues (Hofstede 1983). Moreover, since 
these cultural dimensions can be similar among certain groups of countries and strongly 
different among others, they also help explain the possible conflicts to be seen in increasing 
cooperations across country borders nowadays. 
 
To be more specific, Hofstede (1983) has elaborated on these dimensions. Firstly, power 
distance refers to the way a society perceives about the values and power of superiors and 
their subordinates. This perception can be led to two extremes, with the power distance 
index ranging from low to high. One is the situation in which subordinates do not prefer 
their superiors making decisions on everything themselves but basing on the majority of 
subordinates’ opinions – this group exhibits low power distance. The other extreme, in 
which superiors are supposed and advocated by their subordinates to maintain large power, 
shows high power distance. Secondly, uncertainty avoidance indicates the level of avoiding 
uncertainties in life, for example breaking company rules or leaving one’s employer. This 
dimension also stretches to two poles, with one showing greater anxiety upon uncertainties 
– high uncertainty avoidance – and the other illustrating less anxiety – low uncerstainty 
avoidance. Thirdly, individualism versus collectivism mainly deal with the way an 
individual perceives himself among his organization and the importance of such self-
perception. Individualism means that an individual perceives himself as an independent 
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individual towards community and pays more attention to personal time, freedom and 
challenges. Meanwhile, collectivism implies that an individual is dependent on the 
organization and favors organization’s training, working conditions and benefits over his 
own concerns. Finally, masculinity versus femininity indicate people’s view towards the 
importance of earnings, recognition, challenges versus relationships, cooperations, 
employment security. The former group is considered more important in high masculinity 
countries while the latter outweighs in high femininity countries. (Hofstede 1983) 
 
Upon developing these national cuture dimensions, Hofstede (1991) has introduced the 
fifth dimension of time orientation based the Confucian dynamism, which is a continuum 
of long- and short-term orientation (cited in Fang 2003). According to this dimension, long-
term oriented cultures are dynamic and future oriented. This trait is in close connection 
with 4 attributes: persistence, status and relationship order observance, thrift, and a sense 
of shame. On the opposite side, short-term oriented cultures are steady and past oriented 
with 4 features: personal steadiness and stability, face protection, tradition esteem, and 
favor return (Fang 2003). While these dimensions appear to be rigid and well defined, they 
are subject to change depending on people’s age, gender, education, social status and so 
on. For instance, it can be obvious that gender has a great impact on the last cultural 
dimension, i.e. men across societies usually exhibit more masculinity while women often 
show high femininity. Aged people tend to show higher defense against uncertainties than 
youngsters might do. These factors play moderating roles in the cultural exhibition of one 
country. However, the 4 culture dimensions still work relatively effectively when it comes 
to comparing groups of similar social demographic background across countries (Hofstede 
1983). 
 
Despite the usefulness of these dimensions confirmed in many studies in cross cultural 
management (Kogut and Singh 1988, Shane 1994), the national cultures perspective still 
receives many critiques from current researchers. Hofstede’s project on national cultures is 
first criticized for its no-theory-driven starting point (Javidan et al. 2006). Accordingly, 
Hofstede’s work is not even an action research as it claims to be since it does not involve a 
spiral of such activities required for an action research as fact finding, planning, plan 
changing, and so on. Furthermore, the research was based on a consultancy project for an 
American multinational company. This implies that the result can be US-centered and 
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largely biased by the company’s interests and requirements towards the project. Even 
though the fifth dimension extracted from Chinese culture has been added to the list as the 
main decentering factor (Hofstede 2006), this somehow confirms the limitations of the 
original design (Javidan et al. 2006). It thus raises the question of Hofstede’s research 
creditability. In addition, Fang (2003) criticizes Hofstede’s fifth dimension in that it divides 
interrelated values in Chinese cultures into 2 separate contradicting extremes and does not 
have the same sampling background as the first 4 dimensions (students versus multinational 
company’s employees). Fang (2003) also adds that it is necessary to include Taoist and 
Buddhist values to constructing this cultural dimension. Thus, despite its leading 
contribution to cross-cultural management research, the national cultures perspective still 
poses several drawbacks. Next, I will present the cultural distance concept and its impacts 
on international entry mode. 
 
2.3.2. The influence of cultural distance on international entry mode 
Cultural distance 
Basing on Hofstede’s introduction of national cultural dimensions, many researchers have 
built up the concept of cultural distance (Kogut and Gingh 1988, Erramilli and Rao 1993, 
Sousa and Bradley 2008, Shenkar 2012). Basically, cultural distance is the extent to which 
nations’ cultural values differ from one another (Shenkar 2012). Kogut and Singh (1988) 
evaluate cultural distance by establishing a composite index using Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions. This index basically is calculated through the deviation from the US cultural 
dimension indices along the four Hofstede’s dimensions. The index is used to research the 
influence of national cultures on the choice of entry mode in 506 foreign firms entering the 
US. The results show that the firms lean towards joint venture or wholly-owned greenfield 
when the cultural distance between their original countries and the US is large. This method 
of measurement has a major advantage in “quantifying” the cultural differences among 
countries. Consequently, it has been welcome and widely employed in other existing 
studies (Erramilli and Rao 1993, Barkema, Bell and Pennings 1996, Holtbrügge and Berg 
2004).  
 
However, the cultural distance index also receives a number of critiques for both conceptual 
and methodological attributes (Shenkar 2012). Conceptually, the index does not consider 
the differently-perceived distance from the home and host country’s perspectives. In other 
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words, it implies the identical perception of cultural distance from both side, which does 
not have any support. Another conceptual flaw is that the index suggests a sense of stability 
over time while cultures change and firms’ experiences in a country also affect their choice 
of entry mode. Morever, there is no support showing that cultural distance linearly affect 
entry mode. In other words, the assumption that the larger cultural distance, the less control 
mode is chosen is argueable. In addition, there are limitations in causality and discordance, 
meaning uncertain assumptions that cultural distance results in mode choice and 
differences in cultures means obstacles. Methodologically, the cultural distance index is 
weakened in that the cultural dimensions might have unequal contributions to the index. 
For example, uncertainty avoidance could be more important than other dimensions 
(Hofstede 1989, Barkema and Vermeulen 1998). It is also obvious that the index has left 
out the fifth dimension that was added later. Besides, the cultural distance index might be 
misleading since it does not consider either organizational level cultures or sub-cultures 
within a country. (Shenkar 2012) 
 
Supporting Shenkar’s (2012) argument on methodological flaws of the cultural distance 
index, researchers also agree that it is more sensible to measure cultural distance at an 
individual level rather than a macro level, especially when it comes to the influence on a 
few key decision makers’ choices of entry mode (Stöttinger and Schelgelmilch 1998; 
Evans, Treadgold and Mavondo 2000; Dow and Karunaratna 2006). Also, other aspects of 
countries’ differences such as language, religion and so on, should be integrated in cultural 
distance as well (Dow and Karunaratna 2006, Shenkar 2012) since Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions alone could be insufficient for predicting differences among countries (Dow 
2000).  
 
Compensating for these flaws, Ronen and Shenkar (1985) integrate linguistic differences 
into measuring cultural distance. They have employed a cluster approach towards cultural 
distance, i.e. grouping together countries with similarities in three major cultural 
dimensions: language, geography and religion. Religion is also one important factor in 
certain values and belief of a society, thus Especially, language has been obviated in 
management study yet plays an important role in internationalization decision and mode 
selection (Marschan, Welch and Welch 1997, Luo and Shenkar 2006). West and Graham 
(2004) suggest that language does not only smoothen or block the flow of information but 
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also shape a person’s values and management style. This, in turn, drives a manager’s 
decision of a certain entry mode. This view is shared by López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez 
(2010) and confirmed on 63 Spanish firms internationalizing to 34 different countries. The 
research indicates that language difference increases the chance of joint venture over 
wholly-owned subsidiary.  
Figure 4. Country clusters 
(Ronen and Shenkar 1985, p. 449) 
 
Figure 4 describes Ronen and Shenkar’s (1985) clustering of countries very clearly. In this 
map, it can be obviously seen that countries within a cluster are rather geographically close. 
For example, Finland shares the same group with the three other Nordic countries. This 
group is separated from but very close to the Germanic group which consists of Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland. The both groups have their languages derive from the Germanic 
linguistic family (except for Finnish) and are generally Protestant. Other clusters follow the 
three dimensions of geography, language and religion as well. However, there are still 4 
countries which are in no cluster: Brazil, Japan, India and Israel. Researchers have 
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hypothesized that other dimensions such as economic and technological development have 
outweighted the traditional dimensions. Yet it does not imply these independent countries 
are similar to one another (Ronen and Shenkar 1985). 
 
This study focuses on understanding the drives behind the entry mode choice of startups’ 
top managers, which rather leans towards exploring their perceptions and personal 
experience. Thus it does not make much sense to measure numbers that represent 
differences among countries. In other words, a macro-level index would be of less benefit 
to this research. In addition, the majority of existing literature adopt the quantitative 
research method, which justifies their use of the cultural distance index by Kogut and Singh 
(1988). This study, on the contrary, is an exploratory case study research that aims at 
exploring rather than theory testing. Therefore, I have decided to keep a general 
measurement of cultural distance, using the clustering of nations by Ronen and Shenkar 
(1985). The cluster approach is certainly criticized for its exaggeration of the differences. 
However, considering my study’s objective, it is more important to learn about Finnish 
high-tech startups’ own decisions and perception of cultural differences as personal 
experiences. My purpose is to use the clustering to roughly understand the context in which 
Finnish startups operate. Their own elaborations on cultural differences, in relation to their 
global mindset, will help answer my research questions more precisely, instead of focusing 
too much on measuring macro-level national differences. 
 
The influence on international entry mode 
There are a large number of studies on the influence of cultural differences or cultural 
contexts on entry mode choice. Erramilli’s (1996) research on 337 subsidiaries of American 
and European companies predicts that companies from those countries with large power 
distance and high uncertanty avoidance tend to favor modes with majority ownership. 
Erramilli and Rao (1993) using the cultural distance concept study international entry mode 
choices in 463 US service firms. These firms represent all types of service industries. The 
study has found out that US service firms favor lower-control modes with largely culturally 
distant countries. In a similar vein, Brouthers (2002) conducts study on 178 entries by 
European firms in both manufacturing and service sector. These entries are into 27 different 
countries, mostly transitional and developing ones. The finding supports a cultural 
context’s influence on entry mode choice. Specifically, firms entering low investment risk 
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countries favor wholly-owned subsidiary. Similarly, high risk countries leads firms to 
choose joint venture.  
 
Cultural distance also has major impacts on each entry mode in application. Barkema, Bell 
and Pennings (1996) studying 13 nonfinancial Dutch companies and their foreign ventures 
suggest that large cultural distance has negative influence on the robustness of the foreign 
entries. Holtbrügge and Berg (2004) also employ this cultural distance index to measure 
the knowledge flow in 142 German subsidiaries of multinational companies. The results 
indicate cultural distance positively hinders the flow, which could probably lower the 
efficiency of this entry mode. 
 
However, if cultural distance includes language distance, this dimension drives certain 
specific patterns. For example, López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez (2010) confirm with their 
research on 63 Spanish firms internationalizing to 34 different countries. The result 
indicates that language difference increases the chance of joint venture over wholly-owned 
subsidiary. However, this still supports the conclusion that different cultural contexts of 
countries will influence firms’ entry mode choice, one way or another. 
 
The influence of cultures on traditional companies’ entry mode choice raises a question: 
Do high-tech startups come under the same umbrella? Considering the accelerated 
internationalization process that high-tech startups are usually believed to go through, they 
appear less likely to be influenced by their cultural traits. This may equal their preference 
of non-equity modes due to limited resources (Freeman and Cavusgil 2007). On the other 
hand, due to some traditional traits still found in high-tech startups’ internationalization, 
there are clues to believe this breed of firms is exposed to cultural distance as well. To the 
best of my knowledge, research in this problem almost remains untouched or integrated in 
studies that aim at other purposes. Among few researches dedicated to the entry mode 
strategy of high-tech startups, Fan and Phan (2007) conclude that they are not immune to 
cultural distance. In fact, it still affects, for example, firm’s decision on its capacity division 
among markets. However, like other international entrepreneurship researches that do 
touch the entry mode strategy of high-tech startups, this fails to provide further discussions 
or evidence on this problem, probably due to the employment of quantitative research 
method that do not allow lengthy elaboration from insiders’ view. Therefore, this study is 
  
  
27
open to exploring this new area of research. Next I will review literature on the global 
mindset and its influence on entry mode choice. 
 
2.4. The global mindset 
2.4.1. The global mindset definition 
In order to understand how the global mindset is possibly one of the constructs of entry 
mode choice, it is essential to clarify this idea. This section is devoted to put forward a 
unified understanding for the idea of global mindset to be used in this study and its 
facilitating role for the internationalization process. 
 
A number of studies have attempted to propose definitions for the term “global mindset” 
over 2 decades back. According to Rhinesmith (1993), a global mindset is “a way of being 
rather than a set of skills. It is an orientation of the world that allows one to see certain 
things that others do not. A global mindset means the ability to scan the world from a broad 
perspective, always looking for unexpected trends and opportunities that may constitute a 
threat or an opportunity to achieve personal, professional or organizational objectives” 
(cited in Kedia and Mukherji 1999). Kedia and Mukherji (1999) however pose that a 
sustainable global mindset should be backed up by manager’s knowledge of the 
interdependent world from different perspectives and skills of acculturation and leadership 
for managing diversity. 
 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2002) define the global mindset as “one that combines an 
openness to and awareness of diversity across cultures and markets with a propensity and 
ability to synthesize across this diversity” (p. 117). Developing this definition, and perhaps 
being the most thoroughly developed definition, Levy et al. (2007) view the global mindset 
at individual level as a knowledge structure characterized by three aspects, namely “(1) an 
openness to and awareness of multiple spheres of meaning and action, (2) complex 
representation and articulation of cultural and strategic dynamics, and (3) mediation and 
integration of ideals and actions oriented both to the global and the local” (p. 244). Within 
this study, this definition will be employed to investigate the decision making process of 
international entry mode in Finnish high-tech startups. 
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2.4.2. The influence of the global mindset on international entry mode 
Despite the limitation in number of studies and methodological approach, extant literature 
have confirmed the link between top managers’ global mindset and firms’ 
internationalization and entry mode choice, especially in small companies (Herrmann and 
Datta 2006, Nielsen and Nielsen 2011, Kyvik et al. 2013). Nummela, Saarenketo and 
Puumalainen (2004) emphasize the importance of top managers’ global mindset towards 
small and medium sized firms’ successful internationalization. The survey was conducted 
on 72 Finnish small and medum sized companies operating in the information and 
communication technology sector. The research result shows that firms with the global 
mindset have broader networks of partners and customers overseas, from which a large 
percentage of their revenue derive. The global mindset is therefore confirmed to improve 
firms’ financial performance in foreign markets. Among other things, Kyvik et al. (2013) 
endorse this argument by surveying 215 firms of random sizes in Norway and 257 ones in 
Portugal. It is shown that a CEO with a global mindset is proner to exploring new business 
opportunities in foreign markets, thus accelerating his firm’s internationalization behaviors. 
 
Hutchinson et al. (2007) conducting a case study research on 9 smaller specialist British 
retailers also support this result. The research found out that the international experience 
and knowledge of different cultures and nations have led to top managers’ international 
orientation. This outward-oriented mindset, in turn, produces the necessary conditions for 
firms’ overseas business growth. In a similar vein, Hsu, Chen and Cheng (2013) survey 
187 Taiwanese small and medium sized companies in many industries including 
information and electronics, chemicals and biotechnology, etc. The survey findings 
indicate a phenomenon in which firms’ CEOs possessing international experience are more 
confident and knowledgeable of foreign markets. As a consequence, these people can 
handle the market uncertainties better than those without international exposure. Thus, 
firms’ foreign business performance is much improved (Hsu, Chen and Cheng 2013). 
 
From the dynamic capabilities perspective, Weerawardena et al. (2007) have constructed a 
model of accelerated internationalization. In this study, the authors propose that the profile 
of manager has close connection with firm’s capabilities to acquire and integrate market 
knowledge, to acquire and disseminate technological and non-technological information 
internally, and to network in the accelerated process. These capabilities, in turn, influence 
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firm’s marketing capability and development of knowledge intensive products. 
Consequently, it facilitates accelerated internationalization. In the mean time, manager’s 
profile is greatly contructed by his global mindset. Therefore, the facilitating effect of 
manager’s global mindset towards firms’ rapid successful internationalization is confirmed. 
(Weerawardena et al. 2007) 
 
While the global mindset is believed to facilitates the internationalization process, it is also 
proved to influence entry mode choice. Specifically, top managers’ international 
experience is considered one of the most important contructs of entry mode choice. This 
connection is explained by the managers’ confidence acquired during their international 
assignments or involvement. A research by Nielsen and Nielsen (2011) on 165 Swiss firms 
indicates that international exposure equips the decision makers with extensive expertise 
of foreign markets and business network. These assets lead them to trust in the accuracy of 
their risk estimation. This, in turn, transforms into their favor of wholly-owned operations 
overseas. This argument is also supported and tested on a sample of 78 US manufacturing 
firms in Herrmann and Datta (2006). According to this study, the mindset and knowledge 
of US firms’ CEOs enable them to go for higher levels of resource commitment and control. 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries are therefore preferred over joint ventures in their 380 foreign 
market entries (Herrmann and Datta 2006). Among other things, it is worth mentioning a 
case study on 8 small and medium sized Finnish software firms by Ojala (2007). In this 
research, all the case companies opted for wholly-owned subsidiaries in the Japanese 
market. The research result suggests that managers’ perception of different countries, 
probably developed through international work experience, is critical to firms’ entry into 
even a psychically distant country. 
 
From the above review, it can be seen that little research has been dedicated to the influence 
of the global mindset on high-tech startups’ entry mode choice (Nielsen and Nielsen 2011). 
Extant research on the global mindset as a drive of entry mode choice has reached out to 
small and medium sized companies. While startups are also small firms, their specific 
features like scalability make them deserve further investigation. In prior research, even 
fewer studies are conducted on the relationship between the global mindset and startups’ 
entry modes. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, no research is found examining both 
national cultures and the global mindset simultaneously as factors influencing Finnish high-
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tech startups’ entry mode choice. Therefore, my study is aimed to contribute to this 
problem. 
 
Next, the multiple cultures perspective will be presented as my approach to the research 
problem. 
 
2.5. The multiple cultures perspective 
The global economic context has largely changed over the last 40 years with the balance 
moved towards Asian countries such as Japan, China, South Korea and so on. Hence, there 
is an increasing interest in developing the understanding of an effective interaction way 
among long established Western economies with their new emerging Asian counterparts 
(Sackmann and Phillips 2004). At the same time, the actual “intercultural interaction” also 
flourishes (Boyacigiller et al. 2004, cited in Sackmann and Phillips 2004). Certainly, people 
are the intermediaries among countries. Several managers gradually built their knowledge 
about another countries, including language, working experience and so on. As a matter of 
fact, they develop different assumptions about culture despite national cultures still being 
the fundamental identifying source. Thus, culture at organizational level today becomes 
more relevant in cross-cultural management research. Moreover, along with the change in 
the economic context come the changes in technology, communication, politics and 
society, which also largely contribute to the desperate need of a new approach to cultural 
research: the multiple cultures perspective (Sackmann and Phillips 2004). 
 
The multiple cultures perspective views culture as a collective, socially constructed 
phenomenon (Berger and Luckmann 1996, cited in Sackmann and Phillips 2004). It means 
that a certain group of people that share a set of common beliefs can form its own culture. 
Consequently, many cultures can exist within just one organization, and at different levels, 
not just national cultures. According to this perspective, an individual is believed to belong 
to many different cultural groups that are even likely to be contradicting. Proponents of this 
perspective raise two critical empirical questions and shift their research focus on them: 
“Which culture within organizations is salient?” and “When, why and how does this 
happen?” (Yagi and Kleinberg 2011). Besides, the way multiple cultures interact and how 
individuals handle their multiple identities also become directly relevant. According to 
Sackmann and Phillips (2004), this perspective is extremely useful when applied to seek 
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an insiders’ view of the organization and goes hand in hand with inductive methodologies. 
The multiple cultures perspective has been of great benefits to organizational researchers 
who study organizational or professional identity and cultures and sub-cultures in 
organization. Among other things, it helps shed lights on many organizational paradoxes 
by recognizing the complication in personal identity and organization. From these insights, 
researchers can either make sense of the conflicts in organizational and individual identities 
or suggest important skills to work in an multicultural environment (Sackmann and Phillips 
2004). 
 
The multiple cultures perspective with the above explanation becomes very helpful to my 
research. First, it allows me to look at cultural distance and the global mindset at the same 
level, not as two incomparable factors as used to be seen in many researches before 
(Kuivalainen et al. 2012). This is also in line with prior research’s suggestion that cultural 
distance will make more sense when viewed at individual level in entry mode choice study 
(Ojala 2007). Second, by acknowledging multiple personal identities, I can explain the 
drives behind the thought process of the insiders in entry mode choice. For example, 
accepting that a global minded manager can also belong to, for example, a rather reserved 
culture, can help shed lights on his decisions. Third, the multiple cultures perspective 
matches with my research methodology and method as qualitative case study research 
which results from the requirement of the study objectives. In other words, by focusing on 
a certain number of firms, I can find out insiders’ (Finnish high-tech startups’ managers) 
experiences with international entry modes (Sackmann and Phillips 2004). In the next 
section, I move to putting forward a theoretical framework for my study based on the so 
far reviewed literature.  
 
2.6. Theoretical framework 
In the literature review, I have provided an overview of development and major research 
streams in international entrepreneurship, as well as examined existing studies of cultural 
distance and the global mindset on firms’ entry mode choices. It is important to emphasize 
that, the findings from previous studies regarding startups’ international entry modes are 
neither exactly applicable to the Finnish context nor totally true for Finnish high-tech 
startups. However, a comparison of previous key findings will pave the way for my 
research. Therefore, this sub-chapter is the summary of the extensive examination in the 
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literature review, thus providing a primary theoretical framework for the empirical phase 
of my research. 
 
As the research questions suggested, this study focuses on the roles of national cultures, 
represented by the cultural distance parameter, and the global mindset on Finnish high-tech 
startups’ entry mode choices. In order to provide understanding for this problem, different 
approaches to internationalizing were evaluated since they are interrelated with firms’ 
mode choices. To be more specific, two approaches were reviewed: the traditional 
incremental and the accelerated internationalization. Following was research on firms’ 
international entry modes, especially regarding startups’. After that, studies on the 
influence of national cultures, represented with cultural distance, and the global mindset 
were described. Finally, the multiple cultures perspective was introduced as an approach to 
my research problem. 
 
Firstly, two firms’ internationalization approaches have been presented. The first one is the 
incremental approach as mapped out by Johanson and Valhne (1977) in their stage model 
of internationalization. Following this approach, firms have a tendency of employing 
operation modes at low level of resource commitment when entering a new psychically 
distant market. Only when gaining certain knowledge about the market should they 
increase this commitment level. On the other hand, the accelerated approach is known as 
the rapid internationalization: at a high pace, in multiple markets simultaneously and with 
high resource allocation (Chetty and Campbell-Hunt 2004, Weerabardena et al. 2007). This 
model of internationalization has long been associated with high-tech startups’ 
international operations (McDougall 1989, Oviatt and McDougall 1997, Rialp et al. 2005). 
This view has not yet been universally confirmed in the academic world. In contrast, it is 
even countered by a few recent researches (Chetty and Campbell-Hunt 2004, Fan and Phan 
2007, Gabrielsson and Pelkonen 2008).  
 
However, either this view or its counter arguments were based more often on their 
phenomenological findings than on a theoretical viewpoint. In regard to the 
entrepreneurialness of firms during their early stages of internationalization (Keupp and 
Gassmann 2009), it is justified to think that firms can use both approaches in their 
internationalization. In other words, the 2 approaches are not mutually exclusive. Firms 
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vary their aproaches according to the period of internationalization they are in. The purpose 
is to maximize the benefits that international operations can bring to them (Perks 2009). 
This prediction implies that Finnish high-tech startups’ international entry modes will also 
vary from time to time and not necessarily follow one specific pattern, for instance entering 
foreign markets with from low to high resource commitment entry modes. 
 
Secondly, existing literature on firms’ international entry modes have been reviewed. 
Defined as the way firms use to operate their overseas businesses, international entry modes 
are often classified by the level of control they entitle internationalizing firms over their 
overseas business units (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Pan and Tse 2000, Welch, Benito 
and Petersen 2007). Generally, entry modes fall into either non-equity or equity group, with 
the former including export and contractual agreements, and the latter comprising equity 
joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiary (Pan and Tse 2000). The idea was that the 
equity group of modes requires more resource commitment of firms to the international 
business while the non-equity group does not. Hence, equity modes allow more control for 
internationalizing firms yet pose more risks of loss due to high resource commitment in 
foreign business operations.  
 
Thirdly, many factors have been argued to influence the entry mode decisions of small 
enterprises and high-tech startups (Rennie 1993, Melén and Nordman 2009, Perks 2009, 
Efrat and Shoham 2013). Among other things, the most frequently mentioned factors 
include entrepreneur’s global mindset, product’s knowledge intensive nature, cultural 
differences between home and host countries, and so on. Based on these extant researches, 
this study is targeted to focus on exploring the influence of national cultures, represented 
by cultural distance, and manager’s global mindset on entry mode choice, within the 
context of Finnish high-tech startups. 
 
The cultural distance concept represents the degree of difference in values, norms and 
beliefs of different countries (Shenkar 2012). It is measured by a composite index 
developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) and widely used in many existing researches 
(Erramilli and Rao 1993, Barkema, Bell and Pennings 1996, Holtbrügge and Berg 2004). 
Despite this index’s helpfulness in “quantifying” cultural differences at a macro level, it 
has a number of fundamental limitations such as exclusion of important dimensions 
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(language and religion), stable cultures view, failure to see multiple cultural layers, and so 
on (Shenkar 2012). In order to overcome these flaws, a mainstream framework of cultural 
distance is adopted using Ronen and Shenkar’s (1985) clustering of countries along three 
dimensions: language, geography and religion. This clustering is also in line with my 
research objective and methodology. It keeps a very general perception of cultural distance 
among groups of countries, avoiding going to deep into macro-level cultural distance. 
Instead, this study can dig deeper into individuals’ experience and knowledge about 
cultural distance, which in my opinion is more relevant to my research objectives. 
 
Cultural distance has long been confirmed to influence firms’ internationalization pattern 
and choice of entry mode (Erramilli and Rao 1993, Barkema, Bell and Pennings 1996, 
López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez 2010). Generally speaking, the majority of researches 
conclude that large cultural distance between home and host countries results in firms’ 
favor of lower-control entry modes (Erramilli and Rao Rao 1993, Brouthers 2002). Yet a 
special dimension of cultural distance – language – poses a specific pattern in entry mode 
choice. Language difference tends to drive firms to choose joint venture over wholly-
owned subsidiary in order to bridge the gap (López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez 2010). In any 
case, the influence of cultural distance on entry mode choice is confirmed. 
 
The global mindset is considered another important factor in prior researches in entry mode 
choice. The global mindset is defined as manager’s knowledge to the multi-spheral world, 
articulation of that knowledge and actions resulting from it (Levy et al. 2007). The 
mindset’s influence on internationalization has just received more researches recently 
(Nummela, Saarenketo and Puumalainen 2004, Weerawardena et al. 2007, Kyvik et al. 
2013). These studies attribute small firms’ fast internationalization and excellent overseas 
financial performance to manager’s global mindset. However, researches on the connection 
between manager’s global mindset and entry mode choice are rather limited in number 
(Herrmann and Datta 2006, Ojala 2007, Nielsen and Nielsen 2011). These reseachers 
conclude that manager’s global mindset, mostly developed through international exposure, 
leads to his confidence in estimating risks in foreign markets. This, in turn, results in his 
choice of wholly-owned entry mode instead of joint venture. Almost no research on startups 
is found, creating a gap for my study to fit in. 
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Despite the relatively limited studies dedicated to these factors, it is essential to predict the 
roles of the two factors as contradicting due to two reasons. First, cultural distance has been 
regarded as one of the risk-proposing factors that lead firms to favor the incremental 
approach to internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). This complies with previous 
studies since national cultures’ impact on customer behavioral patterns in different 
countries has been proved (Roth 1995). Second, it is justified that manager’s global 
mindset, basically built up on the basis of his good grasp of diversity across cultures and 
ability to adapt accordingly (Gupta and Govindarajan 2002), enables a certain level of risk 
management for firm in its internationalization. In this case, it makes sense for them to 
favor a highly committed mode, given that it is firm’s strategic market. In addition, in the 
light of the multiple cultures perspective, the global mindset can be seen as a shared culture 
among managers with international exposure while managers’ perceived cultural distance 
makes more sense to firms’ operation. Therefore, it is essential to view these two factors at 
the individual or organizational level rather than at the macro level. From the discussion 
and summary above, I put forward a theoretical framework for the moderating roles of 
national cultures and the global mindset on Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode 
decisions. The framework is presented as in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Theoretical framework of the study 
The core idea of this framework is that Finnish high-tech startups change their entry mode 
choices according to the cultural distance with host markets and their CEOs’ global 
mindset. As Figure 5 shows, entry modes change toward requiring low commitment from 
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high-tech startups when cultural distance increases and the global mindset is weak. On the 
contrary, entry modes move to high committed modes when small cultural distance and 
strong global mindset are in place. In the next section, the research method applied for this 
study will be justified. To be specific, this is a qualitative multiple case study research that 
is based on interviews with the CEOs of five Finnish high-tech startups. The detailed 
description of the research process and an evaluation of the study quality will also be 
presented.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This study is a qualitative research. The adoption of the qualitative research method 
resulted from a careful consideration of the study objective, which is to study the decision 
making process of Finnish high-tech startups in choosing international entry mode. To be 
specific, the qualitative research method allows the study to collect context-sensitive data 
and to give analysis at a holistic view (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). Moreover, the 
nature of the study is more towards looking for the meaning of the phenomenon. Silverman 
(2001, p. 29, in Erikkson and Kovalainen 2008, p. 4) also states: “Quantitative research 
cannot deal with the social and cultural construction of its own ‘variables’”. Thus, it is 
suitable to adopt a reasoning and explaining research method rather than a numerical one 
that aims at measuring variables and testing theories. In addition, regarding the limited 
information on startups’ internationalization process, the study is naturally prone to 
exploring the phenomenon, thus favoring the qualitative research method (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen 2008). 
 
Four arguments proposed by Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004) for using qualitative 
methods in international business research also support the adoption of the methodology in 
this study. Firstly, the qualitative research method facilitates more exploratory and theory-
generating research instead of focusing on empirical testing. Secondly, qualitative research 
allows me to have deeper cross-cultural understanding and leaves out the cultural bias or 
ethnocentric assumptions that I might have during the research process. It provides a more 
holistic approach to study the object in its specific context. Thirdly, the method allows 
suitable research instruments to be chosen for the context in which my study is conducted. 
Finally, it guides me to go beyond the measurement of observable behaviors to seek the 
meaning behind them. In other words, qualitative research method helps me understand the 
“soft” factors that connect complex issues studied. (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch 2004) 
 
In more details about the qualitative approach used in this study, I have adopted case study 
for my research design. The next section is dedicated to elaborating on my research 
approach and design: how it suits my study objective and the study context. 
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3.1. Case study research 
3.1.1. Rationales for a case study research 
For distinguishing among five research strategies of conducting a research, i.e. experiment, 
survey, archival analysis, history and case study, Yin (2003) has developed three 
conditions. These conditions include the type of research question that the research 
proposes, the extent of control over actual behavioral events required for the research, and 
the extent to which the research relates to current as against historical events. Basing my 
choice of research strategy on this model by answering the three questions, I came to 
conclusion of using case study for my research. 
 
First, with regard to my research questions, the focus is on both exploring the possible 
factors facilitating different international entry modes in Finnish high-tech startups (“what” 
question) and explaining the reasons for this phenomenon (“how” question). Yin (2003) 
points out that “what” questions can be exploratory, which favors any of the five research 
strategies. However, “how” and “why” questions tend to tackle problems that need 
following over time (Yin 2003). Thus, it is more likely that my study must rely on a history, 
an experiment or a case study research. Second, the further distinction among these three 
research strategies is the extent of the researcher’s control over behavioral events (between 
experiment and case study research) and the extent to which the research relates to current 
rather than historical events (between history and case study research). It is obvious that 
my study is not dealing with the “dead” past but is aiming at understanding the decisions 
of international entry mode made by startups’ founders or top managers. These people are 
still in charge of running the companies studied and are the main informants of my study. 
Thus, a case study research is applicable to this study as opposed to a history research. 
Besides, an experiment study is not applicable in my study since it is not possible to 
manipulate the informants’ behaviors and decisions directly and precisely in a laboratory 
setting. These decisions happened over a period of time that is long enough so that it cannot 
be controlled and replicated within experimenting conditions. All these elements lead me 
to believe a case study approach is suitable for my study, as Yin (2003, p. 9) states: case 
study research strategy is used when “a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control”. 
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These rationales for choosing case study approach for my study are also supported by other 
researches. Case study research is a key research strategy in international business research 
(Piekkari and Welch 2011) and has long been commonly used in business research 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). Although case study can be both qualitative and 
quantitative, studying cases in business research is normally to provide insight into an issue 
with little knowledge of and the researcher is aiming at establishing a theory for this issue 
(Ghauri 2004). Regarding the research field that my study contributes to, i.e. international 
entrepreneurship, there is a lack of research particularly in the early stages of the 
internationalization process of startups, both theoretically and empirically. Thus, case study 
strategy can be considered as complementing my study, focusing on theory building as the 
primary goal of research (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
3.1.2. Extensive multiple case study research 
There are many ways of doing a case study research, depending on several issues such as 
the purpose of the study, the nature of the research questions, the research design, and so 
on (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) follow the division 
of intensive and extensive case study research in business research. Accordingly, intensive 
case study research relies on ethnographic research traditions, focusing on the uniqueness 
and thick description of the case, interpreting the case and understanding the specific 
contexts. It allows the researcher to be involved in the construction and analysis of the case, 
investigating the sense-making process of the people involved in the study. Intensive case 
study research is normally tentative, meaning no pre-given theoretical propositions. This 
does not necessarily mean that it is not theoretically informed or cannot be used to elaborate 
theory. However, the key interest is in the case itself and the main aim is not to produce 
knowledge to be generalized to other contexts. This type of case study is also termed 
intrinsic case study, aiming at understanding abstract constructs or generic phenomenon 
without focusing on theory building (Stake 1995). 
 
On the contrary, extensive case study research shifts its focus away from any intrinsically 
interesting cases (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). The objectives of this type of research 
are to test or extend existing theory or to build new theory (Eisenhardt 1989). The main 
interest of these studies is in the phenomenon, not in the cases. In extensive case study 
research, usually multiple case studies, not all details of the cases are described as they are 
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in intensive research design, but rather follow a more or less predefined theme. This might 
lead to seemingly thin description in extensive case study research. However, since the 
cases are seen as research instruments for studying the phenomenon, this enables the 
researcher to compare the cases and to look for common patterns, which makes it termed 
as instrumental case study (Stake 1995). From the empirical knowledge generated from the 
cases, the researcher aims at adding something new to the existing theory (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen 2008). 
 
In addition to intensive – extensive categorization, case study research can be divided as 
single and multiple cases (Yin 2003, Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki 2011). Overall, there are 
five rationales for using single case design in business research, i.e. when the case aims at 
theory testing, a distinct case, a prototypical case, the revelatory case, or in a longitudinal 
study (Yin 2003). In adopting single case study reseach, the researcher aims at deep insights 
into highly specific contexts and focuses on the uniqueness of the case, which usually 
makes single case design an intensive research. Researchers who use single case study 
design usually adopt the interpretivist approach to study, with an emphasis on the single 
case and the researchers’ roles in analysis (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki 2011). 
 
Meanwhile, multiple case study research design with the replication logic aims at the 
breadth of the phenomenon, focusing on comparing the cases and searching for chances for 
generalizability, more or less resembling extensive research design (Fletcher and 
Plakoyiannaki 2011). Researchers who use this design tend to adopt the positivist approach, 
stressing the cases’ facts and factual observation (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki 2011). 
However, researchers should notice that there is no room for application of the sampling 
logic to multiple case study research. This is because (a) case studies are not meant for 
evaluating the commonness of the phenomenon, (b) it requires an impossibly large number 
of cases for any statistical consideration of the relevant variables yielded from a case’s 
phenomenon of interest and context, and (c) many important problems could not be 
empirically studies simply due to the small number of available cases (Yin 2003). 
Eisenhardt (1989) also shares this view. This research design also requires modifications 
in order to seek the replication in the cases chosen (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki 2011). 
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Based on the classification by Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki (2011), this study is an extensive 
study drawing on multiple cases. First, an extensive research allows me to follow partly 
predefined theories in international entrepreneurship, particularly research results in 
internationalization process of startups, and to test them in the context of Finnish high-tech 
startups. Second, a multiple case study research enables comparison across cases and show 
common patterns in Finnish high-tech startups’ entry mode choices in particular. Thus, the 
cases serve as a tool for my study in building theory in this specific aspect. Third, extensive 
multiple case study research gives more creditability to this research result, making it more 
generalizable to other conventional settings of high-tech startups in Finland. In addition to 
these reasons, multiple case study design is also in line with my ontological and 
epistemological viewpoint, which is the positivist approach. In the next section, the specific 
context in which my study is conducted is discussed. 
 
3.2. High-tech startups 
Although almost no research in this area makes it clear about the notion of “high 
technology”, I personally think it is necessary to present a united understanding about this 
for my research. There are many definitions for “high technology”, by industries, by 
individual companies, by products or rapid life cycles (Steenhuis and Bruijn 2006). 
However, most of them are related to the amount of knowledge or research and 
development required and how quickly the products become obsolete. Developing from 
this, Steenhuis and Bruijn (2006) propose an approach to identify “high technology” by 
high level in three aspects, i.e. product complexity, production process complexity and 
short product life cycles (Table 1). 
Table 1. Technology classification 
(Steenhuis and Bruijn 2006, p. 1083) 
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To give some exact names of high technology industries, Hatzichronoglou (1997) in an 
OECD working paper of science, technology and industry, basing on R&D intensities of 
the industries, classifies manufacturing industries into high technology and medium high 
technology. This is revised in OCED (2011) as stated in Table 2. As for service industries, 
since direct research and development intensities are not very helpful, other indicators such 
as skill intensity and indirect research and development measures (e.g. investments in ICT 
goods) must be considered by each industry (OCED 2011). This categorization is also used 
in this study as a criterion for case selection. 
Table 2. Classification of manufacturing industries into categories 
 
(OECD 2011) 
Besides, as stated in the background section of the study, it is necessary to develop further 
studies on startups regarding Finland as a small and open economy which leads to its favor 
of and dependence on small and medium sized business (Luostarinen et al. 1994). Next, I 
will describe the selection criteria for the cases and the informants of my study. 
 
3.3. Case companies 
3.3.1. Number of cases 
Deciding the number of cases to be included in the study is a question of great importance. 
As advised by Yin (2003), it is preferable to do many cases when possible due to the 
substantial analytic benefits from two or more cases. With many cases, the contexts are 
likely to vary to some extent. Thus, common conclusions deriving from these cases will 
have greater chances of external generalizability. This view is shared by most researchers 
following a positivist logic (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki 2011). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests 
a number between 4 and 10 cases because with fewer than 4 cases or more than 10 cases, 
it is often considered either unconvincing or too complex to cope with the data produced. 
The author also emphasizes the openness to add more cases during the research process but 
limits the number of cases to the point when incremental contribution of extra cases is 
minimal (Eisenhardt 1989). Following this idea and considering time constraint (within 6 
months) and the availability of resources (single researcher, limited network), I conducted 
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a study of 5 case companies. In addition, since the information collected started to be 
replicated, I decided to stop the data collection after the fifth company. The selection 
criteria for the case companies will be described in the next section. 
 
3.3.2. Criteria for case selection 
The cases for multiple case study research can be selected for many reasons such as 
replicating previous cases or extending extant theories, filling theoretical categories and 
providing polar types of cases, and so on (Eisenhardt 1989). Since this study is aimed at 
theory building, I have chosen prototypical cases, trying to minimize exceptional features 
to increase the chance of external generalizability. Besides, the cases also comply with the 
criteria for Finnish high-tech startups that are proposed at the beginning of this research, 
i.e. Finnish by origin with entrepreneurial characteristics integrated in business operations, 
internationalizing within 6 years of establishment, operating in high technology industries. 
In order to choose the cases for study, my personal contacts were utilized, i.e. my friends’ 
startups and their business networks. As a consequence, I have built up a list of 100 startups 
in the Helsinki region that meet the research requirements, and their CEOs’ contact 
information. Emails were sent to these 100 CEOs explaining the purpose of the study and 
asking for access to data. There were 9 responses to my requests, 1 of which was rejection 
due to present participation in another research. 8 CEOs consented to join my research. 
However, 1 of them asked for phone interview, which I had to reject in order to guarantee 
the data and the study quality. 2 others could not schedule a suitable interview time due to 
their business travels. In the end, I succeeded in interviewing 5 CEOs for the my thesis’s 
data. 
 
3.3.3. Informants of the study 
The main informants of the study were the top managers of the companies who were 
involved in the companies’ internationalization process. These people are those who have 
the strongest influences on companies’ strategies and important moves. Because of the 
young ages of the startups and their scales, there were normally 1-3 top managers at each 
company. With regard to the time scope of this study, I have conducted 1 interview per 
company with its CEO. 
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3.4. Data collection 
Yin (2003) suggests six ways of collecting data for case study, i.e. documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation and physical artifacts. 
First, documentation consists of many different documents such as letters, agendas, 
announcements and meeting minutes, administrative documents, newspaper clippings, and 
so on. Second, archival records include service records, organizational records, survey data, 
personal records, maps and charts, and name lists. These two method can provide exact 
information in written form which is very unobstrusive from the study. However, the 
information can reflect certain bias of its author and can be inaccessible (Yin 2003). Third, 
interviews can be in the approach of objective or active interview (Holstein and Gubrium 
1997) with different types: structured interview (with fixed content), focused interview 
(semi-structured, flexible with a frame) and open interview (with open-ended nature) 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). According to Yin (2003), interview provides researchers 
with insights on the research topics but can be biased if the questions are poorly constructed 
or there is response bias from the respondants. Also, the phenomenon of reflexivity in 
interview – the respondant says what the interviewer wants to hear – can distort the study 
results. Fourth, direct observations involve in the researcher’s field visits to the case study 
“site”, ranging from formal to casual data collection activities. Fifth, participation-
observation is a special mode of observation that allows the researcher to be active in 
constructing the data. The fourth and fifth data collection method provide a real view, exact 
information and insights in the contextual settings required for the study. Yet it is very 
time- and effort-consuming and can lead the context to proceed differently due to the 
researcher’s observation or manipulation (Yin 2003). Sixth, physical artifacts can be 
technological devices, tools or works of art, which may be collected or observed as parts 
of field visits; this source of data however is less relevant in the most typical case study 
(Yin 2003). 
 
The data for my study were collected within a period of six months from May to October 
2015. Considering the six ways of data collection presented above, I decided to retrieve the 
empirical data for my study in two ways. First, the companies’ websites were used for 
collecting some basic information about the companies such as year of establishment, 
number of employees, and so on. Second, most of the data were collected through face-to-
face interview with the CEOs of the case companies as the primary source. For collecting 
  
  
45
primary data, using interview in this study let me have a deep insight into the phenomenon 
in the cases, i.e. the factors that might influence choices of international entry mode in the 
case companies. In addition, my study is aimed at investigating factors influencing the 
choice of entry mode, meaning it largely concerns facts and real experiences. Therefore, an 
objective approach instead of active interviewing is considered to be suitable for my study 
(Yin 2003).  
 
Also, I have tried to keep my data remain focused on my research questions by doing guided 
conversation with the informants in the cases. I have used focused or semi-structured 
interview because this method allows me to go through a theme regarding the partly pre-
given theoretical propositions presented in the literature review. Yet, it leaves room for the 
interviewees to elaborate on their decisions of international entry modes since there is still 
a gap of theory in this aspect that my empirical result will contribute to (Yin 2003). Basing 
on the theoretical framework that was proposed in the literature review, I framed a set of 
required information and themes, thus drafted the interview questions (see Chapter 8. 
Appendices). The questions were used as the guidance for the interviews. However, I have 
added a number of questions for more elaborations when needed, depending on the 
informants’ responses.  
 
I have conducted totally 5 interviews with the 5 CEOs, 1 with each. Each interview lasted 
from 40 to 70 minutes, happening either face-to-face at the companies’ offices or via video 
conferencing due to the interviewees’ working conditions. All the interviews were recorded 
with the interviewees’ permission. Each CEO was asked to sign 2 copies of the recording 
consent form with my signature (see Chapter 8. Appendices). The copies were kept by the 
interviewer and the interviewees, one for each. The recordings and their transcriptions were 
accessible to the interviewer only. In addition, due to the confidentiality reason, I had to 
keep all the case companies’ and the interviewees’ names anonymous. In the empirical 
findings part, I replaced all the names with A, B, C, D, E. Each interviewee shares the same 
name with his company, i.e. Company A – CEO A, Company B – CEO B, Company C – 
CEO C, Company D – CEO D, and Company E – CEO E. 
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3.5. Data analysis 
As Eisenhardt (1989) asserts, “analyzing data is the heart of building theory from case 
studies, but it is both the most difficult and the least codified part of the process” (p. 539). 
Although data collection and data analysis appear to be two separate stages in the research 
process, the researcher actually starts analyzing empirical data very early, usually rarely 
clearly separated from data collection (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). In fact, data 
analysis and collection need to be closely interconnected throughout the case study research 
so that the researcher can ensure the “authenticity” of people’s experiences (Ghauri 2004). 
Moreover, the intertwining of data collection and analysis also allows the research problem 
to be formulated and reformulated at the same time, assuring the circularity of research. 
Ghauri (2004) develops a set of different techniques required in analyzing data. These 
techniques include chronologies, coding, clustering, matrices, decision tree modeling and 
pattern matching. The process of data analysis starts with arranging the information or 
events in the order of occurrence (chronologies), followed by sorting the data by themes 
and concepts (coding). After that, it is important that the similar cases are grouped together 
(clustering) and the similarities are explained (matrices). From this explanation, a picture 
of the real-world phenomenon in question is drafted (decision tree modeling) and compared 
to the initial prediction of the phenomenon (pattern matching) (Ghauri 2004). 
 
Following this process, my data analysis process started as early as the data collection 
process. The interview recordings were listened to twice and transcribed manually without 
using any kind of software. Then I went over the transcriptions twice to familiarize myself 
with the data. After the first interview and its transcription, I sorted the gathered data by 
the themes I used in the interview guiding questions and made sense of them while keeping 
my research questions in sight. Consequently, I made necessary adjustments to the 
interview guide and replicated the procedure with the following interviews. After finishing 
all the interviews, I completed sorting the information and applied the within-case and 
cross-case analysis technique. 
 
Since my study is a multiple case study research, it is essential to conduct within-case 
analysis, followed by cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, Eriksson and Kovalainen 
2008). Within-case analysis is usually the beginning phase of analysis process that enables 
a clear insight into each single case’s characteristics, helping to cope with the complexity 
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and abundance of data (Eisenhardt 1989). In order to do this, I drafted a general description 
of each case companies through thematic content analysis, including business field, year of 
establishment, development process, year of internationalization, current markets, targeted 
customers, entry modes, problems regarding cultural distance, global mindset evaluation. 
This process was done separately for each case companies. After this process, a holistic 
picture of each case companies and their relevancy to the research problems were formed. 
This is presented in the empirical findings chapter of my thesis. 
 
The next step was the cross-case analysis of the data. Cross-case analysis technique entails 
some kinds of comparison among the cases, thus realizing differences as well as common 
patterns across cases (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). Cross-case synthesis is also 
suggested by Yin (2003) especially for multiple case study research, in which each case is 
treated as a separate study and the synthesis process is done in the same way as aggregating 
finding across several studies (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). During this process, I 
analyzed the common patterns across the cases according to the framework set up in the 
literature review chapter. A comparison of the empirical results with the predicted 
theoretical framework is also discussed and explained, using existing related theories and 
studies. This analysis is presented in the discussion and analysis chapter. Next I will move 
on to evaluating the quality of my study. 
 
3.6. Evaluation of the quality of the study 
As clearly stated in this chapter, my study is a qualitative research. According to Eriksson 
and Kovalainen (2008), there are three classic criteria that provide the basic framework to 
evaluate the quality of a business qualitative research. These criteria include reliability, 
validity and generalizability. Basically, reliability reflects the consistency in research. If 
repeated research trials of a research result in the same findings, the research can be 
considered a reliable one. Validity refers to the accuracy of the research conclusions. A 
valid study should have true findings that represent the exact phenomenon happening and 
are evidently supported. Generalizability shows if the research findings can be somehow 
applicable to a larger context. This does not equals a large sample as it does in quantitative 
research. Qualitative generalizability rather implies profound selection of cases so that two 
or more cases support a developed theory (Yin 2003). (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). In 
this study, I have used these three criteria as the framework for evaluating my research. 
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Reliability and validity 
Both of the two criteria are based on the accuracy of the research process and conclusions, 
which are evaluated through analytic induction, triangulation and member check. Analytic 
induction intertwines a research’s data analysis process with data-theory integration. 
Member check is done by the research’s participants when they check the researcher’s 
interpretations of the information they have provided. Triangulation, on the other hand, is 
the process of double-checking the research findings through using multiple resources. 
Triangulation has many forms, including triangulation of methodologies, methods, data, 
theories and researchers. For a case study research, triangulation is also used as a specific 
evaluation criterion. (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008) 
 
In this research, I have used triangulation to evaluate my study’s reliability and validility. 
Particularly, triangulation of data and methods were used. In other words, multiple sources 
of data and analysis techniques have been applied. I have collected the data for my research 
through two sources of information: the companies’ websites and the interviews with the 
companies’ CEOs. Due to the time scope and scheduling with the case companies, I was 
not able to initiate more face-to-face interviews. The fact that only 1 interview per case 
company could be the main drawback of this data collection method since it largely relies 
on the single interviewees’ memory. However, I have tried to compare the information 
through interviews with the companies’ websites and blogs so as to double-check. In 
addition, I have applied two techniques into analyzing the collected data: the within-case 
and the cross-case analysis technique, as described in the previous sub-chapters. Therefore, 
the reliability and validity of my study can be confirmed to some certain extent. 
 
Generalizability 
Yin (2003) emphasizes the “analytic generalization” of a qualitative research, meaning over 
two cases’ evidently-backed empirical findings supporting a previously established theory. 
The findings of this thesis have accomplished this criterion, with the common patterns 
found in the cases supporting certain themes in the theoretical framework presented in the 
previous chapter.  
 
Besides the above three criteria, a case study research can also be evaluated by its 
significance and relevance (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008). In other words, a good case 
  
  
49
study should (a) be of general theoretical or practical interest, (b) have an explicit 
definition, description of its context and relevant evidence, and (c) finish with convincing 
results, not due to time, money or energy exhaustion. This thesis is fully in line with these 
criteria in that the research objectives have been basically rooted in the increasing interest 
in the taking-off of startups in Finland and their rapid internationalization. It is practical to 
take a closer look at what they are doing and the drives behind. Moreover, the research 
context, the case selection criteria, and the empirical data are also presented very clearly in 
the thesis. Most importantly, the study has come to an end with evidence- and theory-based 
arguments and findings. 
 
Finally, in this thesis, I do not only present the evidence that supports the theoretical 
framework but also realize the disparities. Furthermore, I also attempted to explain these 
disparities using existing theories and adapted the previously developed theoretical 
framework accordingly. It is a challenge to present the evidence that is at odds with the 
research findings along with the supporting one. However, I have tried to keep critical 
pieces of evidence so that the research findings can be evaluated transparently and 
independently. This also contributes to the reliability and validity of my study. (Eriksson 
and Kovalainen 2008) 
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this chapter, I provide a general introduction of the case companies and the findings from 
the data collected through both the companies’ websites and the interviews. The findings 
result from my within-case analysis for each company separately. This analysis process 
follows the themes of the theoretical framework proposed in the literature review chapter. 
At the end of this chapter, I make a summary of the commonalities and differences of the 
cases in order to prepare for the cross-case analysis in the next chapter. 
 
4.1. Introduction of the case companies 
Company A 
Company A was established in mid 2010 by CEO A. At the beginning, the company 
specialized in providing cyber security technology in the gaming industry with an 
international customer base in Europe (the UK and Germany) and Korea. However, the PC 
gaming industry has struggled for a while in 2013, moving to mobile gaming afterwards. 
At the same time came the security upgrading requirement in the European legislation for 
banking and financial sector. Thus, the company decided to redirect its business to focus 
on the newly created market in Europe and customized its solution accordingly on the same 
technology base. At the moment, the company has an on-going agreement with Mastercard 
globally. Its target customers include banks and financial service providers all around the 
world. Company A provides it customers with authentification and authorization solution, 
basically increasing user security in the fastest and simplest way. Its solution can be used 
for universal 2-factor authentification, customer authentification for payments, and mobile 
ID services. The company has been going global since its very first days. Its customers are 
in Europe (Germany, the UK, etc.) and Asia (China, Phillipines, Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore). Currently, the company operates with 10 employees in Finland, along with a 
network of local partners in other countries. The company’s currently biggest revenue 
comes from China and Europe. Company A has not yet been present in the US, South 
America and Africa. (CEO A 2015, Company A website) 
 
Company B 
Company B, founded in 2011, was actually a spin-off of a company previously specializing 
in social media in China. The current Company B on the other hand focuses on providing 
translation service globally. The idea of translation service was inspired from the previous 
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company’s business. Company B was basically started on top of the existing foundation of 
that previous company, with the same founder and team members. The service is 
straightforward, allowing the company to target different types of customers including 
individual and corporate customers. The pricing model is quite simple, charging users on 
the word count basis. Currently, the majority of its customers are corporate customers, 
mostly in Northern Europe and the US. The company also has customers in Asia, i.e. 
Hongkong, Japan, Singapore, Korea. Company B has 7 employees at the moment, 3 of 
them in Finland, 3 in the US, and 1 in the UK. In addition, the company has a broad network 
of approximately 100,000 translators working as freelancers providing translation. (CEO 
B 2015, Company B blog) 
 
Company C 
Company C is a wireless service solution provider started in late 2009 in Finland. The 
company is a Finnish company headquartered in Tampere, Finland. The company’s first 
global reseller was also a Finnish company. However, despite the company’s product 
research and development activities in Finland, Company C’s main target customers are 
not Finnish ones. Instead, Company C is truly born internationally in that its customers are 
in the US and Japan. These countries are also the company’s focus at the moment. The idea 
behind the startup is that the company has foreseen a growing demand for high quality wifi 
access and decided to provide solutions to the telecom industry many years before it 
became a major problem. Company C’s customers include wifi service providers, cellular 
carriers, airlines and online travel agencies. The company basically provides solutions to 
improve the speed and quality of the wireless network its customers are providing, even 
customizing the network for certain purposes such as e-commerce. These solutions are 
based on Company C’s patented technology. The company is rather in its early phase of 
building up customer base and operates with a small team in Finland, the US and Japan. 
Company C also works closely with a network of professors and researchers for its product 
development. (CEO C 2015, Company C website) 
 
Company D 
Company D is a Finnish startup in device- and platform-independent mobile instant 
messaging. Started in 2009, the company at the beginning developed a consumer messaging 
service for sending free messages from application. Not long after its first launch in 2010, 
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the company realized the trend and future of messaging – instant messaging. Company D 
then soon built its in-house development team, started fresh and launched the current 
Company D service at the end of 2012. Basically the company is providing Company D 
application - a social messaging application across different platforms, i.e. iOS, Android, 
Firefox and Windows Phone. As the nature of the product suggests, the company is also a 
global company since day one and continuously improves its service offerings. The 
application Company D is based on freemium, meaning it is free to be downloaded and 
used from application stores. An in-app store is included for users to do in-app purchases, 
which is the company’s revenue generator. The company currently focuses on making the 
application viral to boost user acquisition. Its major focus is in South East Asia at the 
moment. Company D is headquarterd in Helsinki, Finland, with an office in Jakarta, 
Indonesia. The company now operates with 22 employees representing 13 different 
nationalities. (CEO D 2015, Company D website) 
 
Company E 
Company E is a Finnish startup in the field of clean technology providing cleantech 
advisory service and collaboration platform to its customers. The idea behind the company 
was formerly an online service under Cleantech Finland’s operation in 2012, on which 
anyone anywhere having questions related to cleantech saving energy, environmental 
topics and the likes can ask experts for advices. Later on, as the need for cleantech service 
increased, Company E was officially established as a separate company in 2013. The 
purpose is to enable the experts to offer whole solutions to the customers’ challenges, not 
only a few pieces of advices. The collaboration platform on Company E’s website thus 
came to existence. It works generally like a social media interface for experts and 
customers, but the process of interfacing is facilitated so as to really solve the problems. 
The company’s customers are all around the world, from Asia (Vietnam, China) to Europe 
(Finland, Slovakia, Sweden). However, the current focus stays in Finland, Slovakia and 
Central Europe. In order to provide the advisory service, Company E has built up a broad 
network of experts which include up to 700 experts from 250 organizations in 50 different 
countries. The company has 7 employees now but runs essentially and effectively based on 
the expert community that is comprised of university professors, consultants and so on. At 
the moment the company operates with 3 offices in Helsinki, Oulu, Finland and Bratislava, 
Slovakia. (CEO E 2015, Company E website) 
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4.2. Findings on the cases 
4.2.1. Company A 
International entry modes 
Despite being a Finnish company, Company A’s very first market and customers were not 
in Finland. The company has been international since it was established. The limited size 
of the market in Finland was mentioned as the first reason that Company A sold it service 
to online gaming companies all over the world. Moreover, online gaming is rather a special 
industry where connections within the industry play more vital roles than country borders 
do. The CEO confirmed: “It’s been natural that…we looked at the online gaming 
(industry)…it was global vertical so we had deals in Korea. We had discussions all around 
the world with online gaming.” (CEO A 2015). Thus, it was reasonable that the company 
went industry vertically, not country by country. Company A approached its customers 
directly by participating in many global events where online gaming companies gathered. 
The purpose, as the CEO described, was to get Company A known by its customers, as 
well as to collect information about its potential customers so as to do the sales work after 
that. Its customers back then were from Korea, the UK and Germany. 
 
Moving on to its new business in banking and financial sector, Company A had still both 
utilized some previous contacts and participated in international exhibitions for financial 
institutions to market itself. The company employed a broad communication approach, 
targeting banking and credit card issuers around the globe. Due to the change in European 
legislation, as explained by the CEO, Company A’s customers now come broadly from 
Europe, including Finland, Germany and the UK. Also as a result of its participation in 
global events, plus its previous contacts, the company reached South East Asia, Phillipines 
to be exact, and China. The company is considerably active in Phillipines and China at the 
moment, looking forward to developing in other areas nearby like Malaysia or Singapore. 
 
Company A employed different entry modes during its internationalization. The company’s 
operations went in two phases: in the gaming industry and in the financial sector. In the 
gaming industry, the company did its own sales of the service, worked with their customers 
by themselves. Specifically, its active participation in international exhibitions made their 
services and solutions known to a number of customers. CEO A highlighted: “…The 
  
  
54
exhibitions and events are a lot about marketing to get them (online gaming companies) to 
know about us…” (CEO A 2015). Since the gaming industry is fairly straightforward in a 
sense that the product is somewhat universal, this facilitated the company’s direct 
communication with its customers regardless of their location. The result was the direct 
“export” of the service without a need of any intermediary party. 
 
On the contrary, having a local reseller was the mode used during Company A’s business 
in the financial sector. This sector works in a rather different way from the online gaming 
industry. Customers in this sector can be big financial institutions who often work with 
many processes and formalities, associated with longer sales cycle. According to CEO A, 
the company has “signed a reseller agreement there (Phillipines) so we have a local 
company representing us…”. Due to the specific features of these cutomers, it was justified 
for them to work with a local company “who knows everything going on with the 
customers” (CEO A 2015). CEO A also emphasized the important role that his company’s 
partner was playing. It was also mentioned that in some cases, the company did start the 
discussion directly with the customers but had to introduce the partner into the discussion 
to actually seal the deal. Along with the agreement, the company needed to give the reseller 
some training about the solutions. The reseller then took charge of the sales part for the 
company in the area.  
 
In addition, at the moment, the company has introduced a Cloud service which can be seen 
as a direct way of sales and communication Company A offers to its global customers. This 
service is available around the clock anywhere in the world, meaning it helps erase any 
inconvenience in time difference or physical location. The customers can just sign up on 
the internet and have conference calls with Company A should they need any technical 
assistance from the company. (CEO A 2015) 
 
Cultural distance 
As mentioned before, Company A customers scatter all around the world from Korea, 
China, Phillipines to Germany, the UK and Finland. With its Finnish identity and an 
identical team of Finnish male employees, it can be said that the company has gone rather 
far internationally into many cultures that are seen as majorly different, if not contradicting. 
For the newly created market for the company in Europe, along with its previous business 
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and customer acquisition, it makes sense that Company A are present in Germany and the 
UK. Yet the CEO also admitted that there was still the language barrier worth concerning. 
For the Asian markets, many cultural traits are mentioned like the language barrier, the 
issues of trust and perception. 
 
One outstanding characteristic mentioned was the way South East Asian customers 
perceive foreign companies, especially European companies. South East Asia is a kind of 
developing area where there are many opportunities to grow but also risks of fraud. 
Towards such a strictly law binding economy like Europe, these customers tend to show 
certain respect. They make a presumption that services provided by European companies 
are of high quality and these service providers are trustworthy to some certain extent. 
“…(In) South East Asia, they do respect, they do kind of look at European companies as 
good companies.” CEO A also highlighted this attribute by comparing with customers from 
other areas: “US is pretty specific market and you have to be American to really win the 
market...It’s kind of much easier for us (in South East Asia)…”. Plus some contacts there, 
Company A ended up doing business in these countries other than the US or South 
America. (CEO A 2015) 
 
However, a good reputation for quality is not enough for an European company to win its 
business in Asia, particularly in the banking and financial sector. Financial institutions 
would rather strictly following their working routines and procedures. When it comes to 
Asian customers, it is also justified to presume these as very hierarchical organizations. 
This of course required long discussions and repeated sales meetings, as confirmed by CEO 
A. Therefore, it was then a preferential solution that Company A introduced its local 
representative into the cycle. This local company was described as already having banks as 
cutomers. “In financial sector sometimes it’s not possible to do the deal directly unless you 
have a local partner who has the relationship”. (CEO A 2015) 
 
According to CEO A, the language barrier is always one of the problems since the company 
can only use either Finnish or English for business purpose. This issue is present not only 
in Asian countries but also in Europe. The CEO expressed that he did want to expand the 
sales force internationally, ”…doesn’t have to be a German guy but somebody who speak 
German could be very beneficial.” He explained that since in some countries English is not 
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used popularly as a global language, it also made it difficult for the company to do business 
there. “We tried to do deals in Thailand which were very difficult because of the language 
barriers.” (CEO A 2015) 
 
The language issue sometimes led to the trust issue in business. CEO A explained the 
situation for China, taking an example from his own previous experience: ”We had a 
Chinese guy in Norway who spoke Chinese so it was much better to build the trust … where 
Chinese didn’t have to try to speak English on the phone…” (CEO A 2015). The fact of 
having a local partner or a local employee thus has actually proved itself to be of great 
benefit to the business. 
 
Global mindset 
CEO A, the entrepreneur of Company A, started his career in 1993 after finishing his 
vocational degree in information technology. Starting as a programmer, he moved on to 
establishing his first startup as early as in 1997. In 1999, he sold the company and moved 
to work for a Norwegian startup. Though he was not the founder of the company in Norway, 
the entrepreneur was a part of the management team with some ownership. He was in 
Norway for six years. The company was later on sold to a US-based company. CEO A 
continued working there for extra two years before deciding to start Company A. It is 
obvious to see that the entrepreneur actually had no background in business education. Still 
his career so far has always been involving with both the technical and business sides. (CEO 
A 2015) 
 
Working in Norway for six years, it had been a real international working experience for 
him. His company was then based in Norway but did not have any Norwegian customers. 
Instead, its customers were from China, Italy, Taiwan and so on. This had been a global 
company that enabled CEO A to work with a very international team. The entrepreneur 
described his working experience with his ex-colleagues: “…We had a team where there 
were Hungarians, Australians, Finns, Norwegians, Chineses, Malaysians, so we had a very 
international team and we got along very well.” Apparently, his experience with such an 
international team had been rather comfortable for him. CEO A did mention the clash of 
cultures at his workplace, giving an example of the calm and quite way of the Finns and 
Norwegians with which the Greeks got frustrated. However, despite the tension this culture 
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clash created sometimes, the entrepreneur emphasized that this was indeed not a major 
problem for him. (CEO A 2015) 
 
Furthermore, CEO A explained that the whole career between engineering and 
marketing/sales has been very helpful to him so far. The experience has equipped him with 
the ability to communicate either technical problems or business ones in a clear and simple 
way. According to him, this was his only solution to accommodate his co-workers and to 
smoothen every task. The entrepreneur also expressed a high level of confidence in working 
with people from not only different cultures but also different educational backgrounds. In 
addition, CEO A shared his thoughts on building a diversified team in Company A, noting 
that the Finnish way of thinking was not that universal and having only one way of thinking 
was definitely not very beneficial to the company. He also expressed his agreement with 
bringing different cultures into the company to introduce more angles and opinions to the 
business. (CEO A 2015) 
 
In addition, the CEO had to admit that a more structured way of internationalization could 
have helped his business to reach a further range of customers. “…We just now went very 
broadly to go with banks and anywhere…it sometimes feels like we are doing so tiny bit 
here and there that maybe could’ve been better to go more step by step and do a little bit 
more in one country…Maybe some marketing effort more and generate PR…”. It seems 
that customers’ specific features in different areas require more commitment from the 
company since marketing and PR activities are often customized particularly to target some 
certain groups of customers. (CEO A 2015) 
 
4.2.2. Company B 
International entry modes 
As introduced above, the current Company B has been operating for almost four years so 
far. Built on the basis of a previous company which had been already involved in 
international operations, Company B quickly became global though its first customers were 
from Finland. CEO B explained this as a very natural path for their business, that 
“…translation industry is quite easy in the sense that it’s global by nature”. He noted that 
there was always a need for translation service and customers can be either small customers 
with simple documents to be translated, or larger companies who want to localize their 
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websites and to communicate with local customers in their own languages. The market is 
always available and customers could easily be found. (CEO B 2015) 
 
At the moment, the company provides translation service on an automated platform. This 
platform facilitates the users – customers to do everything by themselves: uploading 
documents, inputting their contacts and instructions for translation, paying for the bills. The 
translation itself, however, is done by the company’s network of translators. According to 
CEO B, there are roughly two types of customers: the very small companies refered to as 
the mass market and the huge corporations. In the way the platform runs, there is almost 
no need for Company B to meet customers in the mass market directly since they can get 
everything done by themselves. For the huge corporate customers, however, it took 
Company B pretty long time, up to 3-6 months, to actually close the deals which could last 
for couple years. Company B’s customers at present largely falls into the first category. 
The company currently targets corporate customers, not consumers since they can opt for 
free translating tools on the internet. (CEO B 2015) 
 
In addition, the company is now focusing on Northern Europe and the US. Explaining this 
market concentration, CEO B mentioned the fact that the company was of Finnish origin, 
plus the neighboring countries are not exactly the same but very similar in culture. Besides, 
Company B is still in an early stage of its business, which leads to a need of investors. “We 
need to be present in the US also because it’s the big source of venture capital…focusing 
only in Finland for example would not be enough because all sources that’re available funds 
has already been used”, noted CEO B. The company does have customers from other parts 
of Europe or Asia as the result of their sales effort and mass marketing. However, the CEO 
emphasized that they need to stay focused on certain markets instead of spreading their 
resources everywhere. (CEO B 2015) 
 
For the strategic markets, Company B has set up its own offices. To be more specific, they 
have one office in Finland and one office in the US. The office in Finland is the company’s 
headquarter which is also in charge of the Northern Europe region. Three employees are 
based in this office now. Meanwhile the US office was opened in 2013. As explained 
before, the US market is rather an important one, not only for the market size but also for 
the company’s sources of investment. According to CEO B,  the company in Silicon Valley 
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is currently run by the founder of the company with the assistance of two more employees. 
This is now an active part of their business. The company also has one office in London 
with one employee doing mostly sales and managing the network of translators. The 
employee is British. However, CEO B explained that this was a coincidence and this person 
had joined the startup from the beginning without the company’s intention of expanding to 
the UK at that time. (CEO B 2015) 
 
In addition, Company B has signed a sales agreement with a Finnish sales agent who lives 
in Singapore. This person, as described by CEO B, has some relations in Singapore and 
basically does the sales work connecting Company B and its potential customers. The sales 
agent does not take part in the operation of the platform or service; neither does he bear any 
responsibility for delivering the service. His work is based on the sales target and on the 
commission basis. However, CEO B also noted that since some connections for the 
company have been established, the agent is not very active at the moment. The CEO did 
mention other sales agents in some other areas but they are not really actively selling the 
company. (CEO B 2015) 
 
In some cases, Company B did approach the customers directly by emailing them. Thanks 
to an expanded network of translators, it seems that the language barrier does not pose 
significant problems to the company. According to CEO B, some of these customers 
include Chinese and Korean ones that the marketing founder of the company met in 
meeting in China. Some follow-up emails were sent afterwards in Chinese and Korean and 
in those cases, direct communication actually worked for the company. Yet, these 
customers remain in the minority of Company B’s customer base. The focus, as clearly 
stated by CEO B, is still the US and Northern European countries. (CEO B 2015) 
 
Cultural distance 
Company B as explained so far has been a truly global company by its nature. The service 
itself is a connecting tool for different cultures; the broad network of translators is from 
many different countries; the current customer base spreads all over the globe. Along with 
this global business, CEO B yet mentioned some problems with the cultures and thus its 
requirement of efforts, including the working styles and the connections in the markets.  
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When Company B first came to the US, it was majorly reliant on the advice network that 
was introduced by the company’s investors. These advisors then made referrals and 
introduction of Company B to its potential customers. The CEO admitted: “That’s a way 
to kind of the first meeting, otherwise it’s very difficult”. He also gave an example of his 
Finnish ex-colleague who spent quite a few years in the US constantly building a network 
of personal contacts from scratch before successfully acquiring big customers there. It 
appears that the US is rather a specific market that requires lots of commitment from any 
company so that they can get rewarding results out of it. Meanwhile, the Northern European 
market seems not to pose many significant risks for the company so far. It is probably due 
to the similarities in culture, which was also the factor leading to Company B’s choice of 
this strategic market. (CEO B 2015) 
 
Besides, the CEO also discussed the difference between two existing markets of the US 
and Asia. They were described as fundamentally different in their working dynamics. The 
Asian customers “…have more clear organization, hierachy and structure…they have way 
of working and they follow all the same pattern that they’ve always done…and to change 
that pattern is very difficult.” In the meanwhile, the Americans are probably changing rather 
quickly and moving with more stronger decisions. CEO B also noted that, “…when you’re 
in there (Asia), …you get to be inthere to continue…If we really want to sell more in Asia, 
we should have an office in Asia, so that agent does not really help”. (CEO B 2015) 
 
From these comments it appears that Asian countries probably requires more engagement 
from the company to actually expand its customer base there. Having a sales person as 
agent in Singapore definitely helped in a way that the agent’s connections can lead the 
company to some deals, as confirmed by CEO B. This is for sure not enough to win over a 
large number of customers in Asian countries due to the thinly resources and efforts. These 
customers’ procedural working style implies on-going involvement of the company, in 
other words, its presence in the region. However, the CEO also noted that “the whole 
culture and everything are so different, and it just takes a lot of time (to have an office 
there)”. So the company still decided to go with sales agent agreements. In any case, this 
is of course because the company’s resources are now kept focused on the US and Northern 
Europe. (CEO B 2015) 
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Global mindset 
CEO B has been the CEO of Company B since October 2014. He completed his Master 
degree of Science in mathematics from Aalto University School of Technology. Despite 
his major in mathematics, the CEO did have minor study in economics, focusing on 
financial economics. After finishing his degree, CEO B worked for a bank as a credit and 
risk analyst. One year after that, he joined a consulting firm based in Helsinki and spent 
one and a half year working as a management consultant, mostly related to data analysis 
and sales planning operation management. After that, he moved to a Finnish startup in 
maritime industry, leading their data analysis business. Three years after that, he joined 
Company B as to lead the Finnish operation abroad development and finance. At the 
moment, as the CEO, he is also in charge of the whole company’s operations besides the 
previous tasks. (CEO B 2015) 
 
According to CEO B, three-year working experience in the startup in maritime had been 
very international. The startup was a Finnish company based in Helsinki but had been very 
global in that its customer base was outside Finland way back then. They did have offices 
in different countries like Singapore or the US with employees working there. CEO B 
himself also spent quite some time travelling to the US, contacting to their US customers 
and working in a fully international team. Moving on to work for Company B, a global 
startup, also gave him opportunities to work with customers from different countries. It 
appears that the prior international experience contributes to his understanding of possible 
differences and the need of having contacts in the target markets. In turn, this leads to his 
opinion of making more commitment, like having an own office, to help boost the business 
in Asia. (CEO B 2015) 
 
The CEO also gave an example of problem that he had observed during his international 
experience. “The biggest difficulty is always…whether they are Finns or from some other 
cultures…to work as part of a team if you are not in the same place”. The problem of mutual 
respect was also mentioned as a cause of conflict, for example Finn’s and American’s 
different respects for career or education. However, it sounds that this was not a major 
problem for him, given his experience in a global environment before. Again, this 
confidence expressed by CEO B somewhat leads to his willingness to take further 
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engagement in Singapore should they have enough financial and human resources to do so. 
(CEO B 2015) 
 
4.2.3. Company C 
International entry modes 
Company C has been a rather young startup which was born internationally in that its 
customers have never been in Finland. The company went outside Finland with a global 
reseller which was a big construction company having a broad network in the mobile 
wireless industry. However, the startup strongly started its international business in the 
recent three years with its offices in the US and Japan. The company is headquartered in 
Finland mostly for its research and development activities led by Company C’s CTO. In 
the meantime, the US office is run by the the company’s CEO and one of the founders 
manages the Japan office. The company has recently introduced its new solutions into the 
Japan market and in Finland. (CEO C 2015, Company C website) 
 
According to CEO C, the company’s presence in the US could possibly be attributed to the 
potential size of the market. “It may take a lot of time but of course if the product is right 
for the US market, it’s meybe the best market”. In addition, since Company C is still in its 
very initial stages, there is a drive for funding for further growth. This also led the startup 
to expand its business to the US. As for Japan, Company C’s physical presence there has 
been made by the company Japanese founder. Moreover, according to the CEO, Japan is 
considered an advanced market in the industry which is leading innovations as well as 
product quality requirements. Conquering this market opens up many opportunities to go 
to less developed markets for the company. Thus, it was almost a must and a natural 
decision that they were selling solutions in Japan. (CEO C 2015) 
 
It appears that Company C’s internatinalization was largely led by the telecom solution 
industry. More speciafically, one reason was that it could be the limited market in Finland. 
Furthermore, the fact that one of the founder is Japanese, plus Japan at the same time is a 
big competitive but promising market, contributes to their business in the country. It is also 
very early in their development that the company is just trying to exploit every of its 
existing resources. 
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As can be seen from above, Company C currently has its own offices in Finland, Japan and 
the US. Each office point has Company C’s own employees work there. In Finland, it is 
mostly the research and development team focusing on the technology patented for the 
company. Meanwhile, in the US and Japan, it has largely been the business development 
and the sales part. CEO C working in the US is also in charge of seeking for funding sources 
for the company’s future growth. In each market, they work to sell their solutions to the 
local telecom operators. (CEO C 2015) 
 
The most noticeable point is that even though Company C has been physically present in 
the US and Japan, they still chose to go through some intermediary companies – system 
integrators – in order to get the sales done. Explaining this decision, the CEO shared that it 
was mostly related to the way the industry functions. The wireless solution industry itself 
works in a way that big dominating mobile operators/customers usually buy solutions from 
a few providers that have been servicing them for quite a time. It was then not favorable 
for new comers to approach them directly. Again, this shows that the company’s decision 
and movement has been closely connected to the industry specific features. In any case, 
regardless of selling directly or through the integrators, Company C by itself is still doing 
the contract with the customers, who is the mobile operators. (CEO C 2015) 
 
Cultural distance 
The CEO of Company C observed two aspects of culture during his business with Company 
C as well as from his previous experience. The first was the problem of trust and 
relationships. The other, being less crucial, was the language, i.e. Japanese. The trust issue 
sounds like an important one that led to their physical presence with local people in both 
Japan and the US. It is of course one of the special characteristics of the industry. However, 
it can also be seen as the way people work in those countries. The CEO shared that they 
also reached the potential customers in Japan thanks to the Japanese employee of the 
company who had the relationship in the telecom industry for many years. “Of course he’s 
a local, he speaks Japanese, he has the relationships and he understands business”, 
described the CEO. The customers have long worked with a few main system integrators 
that it has become a kind of general rules for them to do so. The trust is so important that 
they might work with fewer middle companies rather than a hundred suppliers. He also 
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emphasized that it was unlikely to sell directly despite the superior quality of the product. 
(CEO C 2015) 
 
According to CEO C, the situation appears to be less difficult for their business in the US. 
The CEO himself is also very experienced with the market throughout his years doing 
business here. In that sense, he can also be considered a “local” representative of Company 
C in the market. The CEO shared that there might be different ways of going to the US 
market, either hiring people that have connections or going to some tradeshows talking to 
the customers and leaving out the middle man. However, he still went with a reseller who 
is a big well-respected American company in the industry. “They are our core 
resellers…they have the resources to do that and I have hired them…the operators are very 
hard customers to deal with”, explained CEO C. It looks like doing business in the US 
requires not only large commitment with frequent presence there, but also the relationships 
and other resources. At the moment, despite having an employee in the market, Company 
C still have not had enough reputation to cover the market by itself, which led to the reseller 
agreement. (CEO C 2015) 
 
A rather minor issue mentioned was the language. The CEO also confirmed that people do 
not speak English well in Japan that almost anyone has no better choice than speaking 
Japanese. Consequently, he of course emphasized the importance of the Japanese founder 
of the company. (CEO C 2015) 
 
Global mindset 
CEO C joined Company C as a consultant who helped with the business 
internationalization strategy and capital raising for growth in late 2011. Starting with a 
background in computer science education, he initially had no business education; instead 
he learned every business knowledge by actually doing. Later on he did finish an intensive 
executive education program in University of Washington in the US, getting an MBA. CEO 
C is currently the CEO of Company C, working constantly in the US. Sharing about his 
career, CEO C started as a software designer but quickly transitioned into management 
position. He has been working in the mobile wireless sector all the time, from Finland to 
the US. The CEO had quite a lot of experience working with startups and their business, 
especially internationally born startups. Throughout his career, he got involved in as well 
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as ran businesses in Europe (Germany, Denmark, France, Finland), Middle East (Jordan, 
Egypt), Asia (Hongkong, Singpore, Japan), South America (Venezuela) and especially 
twenty years in the US. (CEO C 2015) 
 
From these sharings, it is apparent that the CEO had equipped himself with an immense 
range of international experience prior to Company C. In the US, he had built a personal 
reputation and been able to sell solutions in the industry. In Japan, he also worked with 
another company, having an office in Tokyo doing business there quite a time. An obvious 
fact is that his previous experiences helped him understand the markets of Company C and 
the industry so well. This in turn could result in the company’s decision to go with the 
reseller for example in the US. (CEO C 2015) 
 
4.2.4. Company D 
International entry modes 
First, it is necessary to understand the company’s revenue generating model. The Company 
D application functions on the freemium basis. Basically this means that the app is free to 
download and to install into users’ smart devices. The company then offers many types of 
in-app purchases, like stickers, to its users during their usage of the app. If they like and 
pay for these offerings, they become the company’s paying customers, not free users 
anymore. (CEO D 2015) 
 
Company D is a special case of all because its product is a mobile application. This 
particular type of product nowadays work in a way that could be seen as beyond any 
country border. Developers only need to launch their applications on the mobile application 
store for smartphones, such as Appstore or Google Play store. Thus the applications are 
immediately available to customers all over the world as soon as they are launched. In that 
sense, Company D has been a global company since its very beginning. Company D’s 
social messaging application is available across different operating platforms for various 
brands of smartphones. There is theoretically no first market for the company, definitely 
not Finland. To some certain extent, it can be said that Company D’s product has reached 
out to every single one of its potential customers without the need of any specific entry 
mode. 
 
  
  
66
However, despite being launched globally since day one, the product is not creating a real 
business if its potential customers always remain “potential”. In other words, if the 
Company D app is not promoted to become popular to its potential customers, they will not 
use it and there will be no business. After launching the app, the company noticed its natural 
take-off in certain regions. CEO D, the co-founder and current CEO of the company, 
explained that the organic users came mostly of South East Asian countries when the app 
was launched. Therefore, it was justified for Company D to focus on boosting their business 
in the area, mostly in Thailand, Indonesia, Phillipines. The app is also gaining in popularity 
in South America, particularly Brazil. China is also a big promising market and the 
company is keeping developing its customized service for China. Other big markets include 
India, Turkey and so on. (CEO D 2015) 
 
For a company like Company D, the mobile application store plays a vital role in their 
internationalization. The store has advanced their business a long way in that it made the 
app visible to a broad range of customers right from the beginning. In some ways, the 
application store can be seen as a direct export of the product to different countries or areas. 
The word “export” is of course not exact in this case because still the app is not necessarily 
downloaded from the store, or used by users/customers even when they already download 
it. In other words, Company D does not necessarily have regular renevue just by uploading 
its app onto the store. However, this is still the very important first entry of Company D in 
its internationalization. 
 
After the app became popular naturally in some countries, Company D started focusing its 
efforts into those areas of organic customers. The most active users had come from South 
East Asian countries, with Thailand, Indonesia, Phillipines topping the list. The company 
then first focused on making the app viral by improving its quality, increasing ratings and 
rankings in the app store. At the same time, Company D also attempted to get more 
presence in the social media by partnering with some media companies and operators in 
the region. The closest partnerships were in Indonesia and CEO D himself also travelled 
there on monthly basis to work with the partners. Besides, Company D also signed a 
partnership contract with a business development partner in Singapore. (CEO D 2015) 
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Since February 2015, Company D has been physically present in Indonesia with its own 
office. The office is run by two Indonesian employees who had been working for Company 
D. This office is also Company D’s regional office, in charge of the whole Asia Pacific 
region. According to CEO D, the two local employees in Indonesia have been taking care 
of the app’s quality assurance, customer care and community management. They also work 
with the company’s partners and handle the negotiations of the agreements with them. 
However, the Helsinki office still remains the signing right and approval of the contracts. 
CEO D still maintain quarterly visit to the office and also travel there to have official 
meeting if needed. (CEO D 2015) 
 
As for the taking-off market in South America, according to CEO D, this is mostly because 
Company D is among the few instant messaging apps operated on Firefox – the mobile 
operating system popularly used in the region. Besides, it was also the result of Company 
D’s participation in Microsoft’s global visibility program. At the moment, the company is 
considering different options to boost its business, looking for partnerships and/or bringing 
more commitment there. (CEO D 2015) 
 
Cultural distance 
The CEO of Company D mentioned a number of factors that could be seen as related to the 
company’s entry modes. According to him, there are many differences in users’ habits in 
different contries. “Some people in some countries, they use more one-to-one chat, some 
countries they use more group chat. Some countries they prefer sending more texts, some 
countries they really like our stikers and some countries like push-to-talk…”, described 
CEO D. The variety of users’ preferences has lead to Company D’s great efforts in 
customizing the service to each of the countries. First of all, the app needed to be local in 
its languages. For every local app store, Company D had to provide corresponding language 
setting so that the description, instructions and so on had to be in local languages. After 
users get their localized version of the app, next came the localized user experiences. 
Company D worked with local illustrators to create the stickers that connected with the 
local appeal and design. Finally, Company D held press events to launch the new stickers, 
as they did recently in Jakarta, Indonesia. Obviously it can be seen that the differences in 
users’ habits have created many works for Company D. The company had to invest more 
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and more of its resources in order to serve the market in Asia. This implies that cultural 
difference has certainly led to the company’s physical presence in Indonesia. (CEO D 2015) 
 
The commitment issue was also mentioned as one of the reasons that the company decided 
to have its own office instead of only working with the partners. The product is described 
as special in terms of its continuous development. Company D needs to keep updating its 
product and services quickly enough to serve its customers and in that sense, “…the product 
is never gonna be ready…”, said the CEO. He emphasized that the sales people had to know 
the product extremely well in order to promote it in the right way. The fact that the partners 
can not access confidential information about the product means that they can not make the 
best out of it. Thus, it became essential for Company D to have its own employees working 
in the region. In addition, the company had already had an Indonesian employee at that 
time, which also made the decision easier, as confirmed by CEO D. (CEO D 2015) 
 
Global mindset 
CEO D, the co-founder and CEO of Company D, finished his bachelor degree in 
economics, later on got an MBA. He started his career first with working for a telecom 
operator in Finland in 1999. In the company, CEO D was in charge of sales and marketing 
operations, particularly involved in international projects and business development of the 
company. After six years working for the telecom operator, he moved to work in 
advertising business in 2005 in a startup where he first met Arto Boman, the founder of 
Company D. He spent two and a half year with the startup before joining a boradcasting 
company. Finally in 2009, he co-founded Company D and is currently the company’s CEO. 
(CEO D 2015) 
 
According to CEO D, he had been involved in many international projects long before 
joining Company D. During the time working in telecom industry, his job was mainly to 
help launch some Finnish services to other countries in Europe, like Italy. On the contrary, 
his responsibilities included importing and introducing massive multiple online games from 
Korea into Finland. Moving onto working for Company D, the whole time has been very 
international experience for him with partners from Asia and Europe. Moreover, the 
Company D team is truly global with people from 13 different nationalities working 
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together. It appears to the CEO as no major prolem managing diversity, given his 
experience working internationally. (CEO D 2015) 
 
One of the most noticeable point is that the international team working for Company D at 
the moment was built up on purpose. CEO D shared: “We actually made a strategic 
decision…From the day one we built the global team…we decided that all job 
announcements will be in English”. The CEO also emphasized that it is the way the 
company differentiated itself in the labor market and the team has brought many benefits 
to Company D. One of them was that the office in Indonesia, as explained, was smoothened 
by relocating the company’s Indonesian employees from Helsinki back to the country. 
Another was an extended network of local users, for example in China. These users, who 
are families, relatives and friends of Company D’s employees, are willing to try the app 
and to report back any things to improve. CEO D also gave an example of how they 
developed the push-to-talk function of the app, the idea of which was actually raised by a 
Chinese employee, trying to save people time of typing complicated Chinese characters. It 
is apparent that with his international exposure and willingness to adapt, the CEO could 
help advance the business further, with more commitment where they want to go. (CEO D 
2015) 
 
4.2.5. Company E 
International entry modes 
In general, Company E’s customers will need to go through a three-step journey. First, a 
customer goes to the platform Company E.fi to raise a dialogue for defining their problem 
and getting the right experts involved. Second, a team of qualified experts will be selected 
for the customer’s problem and work to customize a solution to that. Third, the experts will 
deliver a whole solution package or instructions for solving the customer’s problem in a 
fast and effective way. The first step is free while customers have to pay for the second and 
third step in the journey. (Company E website) 
 
Company E started firstly with providing its solutions in Finland. As part of Cleantech 
Finland program for roughly one year in 2012, the idea of Company E has attracted many 
customers in Finland. First known as the new marketing concept of “Ask the Experts”, the 
idea was to nominate experts’ services from Finnish clean technology companies globally 
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through a digital channel. Through this channel, dialogues between customers and the 
experts are created and the experts can promote their own technologies. The concept then 
also attracted customers from other parts of the world under the promotion of Cleantech 
Finland, like China, Vietnam, Russia. In 2013 when the company was officially 
established, it immediately grew internationally. Indeed, the company could be considered 
as a global company since its very early stage. (CEO E 2015) 
 
According to CEO E, the founder and CEO of Company E, the company currently has three 
offices in Finland and Slovakia. It was very natural for Company E to be physically present 
in these countries due to the founders’ countries of origin.  They are from different countries 
including Finland, Slovakia, Austria, Russia, Asia and so on. However, the focus of the 
business is in Central Europe and Scandinavia. The CEO emphasized that they had made 
marketing test and strategically decided that they would focus on these markets during this 
early phase of the company. He also noted that they would go step by step in case of going 
more internationally: first initiating projects and then opening own office if there is big 
volume of projects. “I think that…it is very essential that you have a process how to go 
international instead of a random approach…you need to have a plan…to go there step by 
step”, explained the entrepreneur. (CEO E 2015) 
 
General speaking, Company E has employed two different entry modes in its 
internationalization: having its own office and signing sales agent contract. As said, 
Company E is present with offices in Finland and Slovakia. Company E’s first customers 
mostly came from these two physical points. Indeed, they were from the founders’ previous 
contacts in the industry. The office in Slovakia also takes full responsibility of developing 
the digital platform. (CEO E 2015) 
 
In addition, the network of experts also played an important role in Company E’s 
international business. It seems that the network of experts has been actively initiating 
projects for the company. These experts on one hand are the service providers; on the other 
hand, they also act as Company E’s sales agents in different countries. According to CEO 
E, the company started with roughly 100 experts and over two years since established has 
increased this number to 700 people from 50 different countries. They, referred to as 
“business leads”, have the motivation to connect customers in their own countries with the 
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company in that they get commission for the sales. Mostly these people are from Finland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, the UK, France and Russia. The company has just 
signed the agent agreement with one or two of them but the idea is to sign the contract with 
all of them. The entrepreneur also noted that Company E remains to be the one who signs 
the contract with its customers. However, the idea in long term is that the business leads 
can make contracts directly with the customers but through Company E’s platform, so that 
the company can have control of the contracts and money flows. (CEO E 2015) 
 
In addition, the CEO shared that it is just the matter of time that they open offices in some 
other countries or regions when they have enough resources. “Of course we know that if 
we’re seriously going to enter Vietnamese market, we need to be somehow locally present 
there…Even though we have the digital channel and virtual presences but maybe some 
physical presence is also needed.” However, he also emphasized that it is strategic that the 
company would go step by step, first with the business lead, then with the own office. (CEO 
E 2015) 
 
Cultural distance 
The issue of trust was mentioned as the first and foremost cultural trait that CEO E noticed 
in his business across countries, especially between Finland and other countries the 
business is present. According to him, winning people’s trust does not take so much effort 
since Finland is rather a small country in which it is somewhat easier for one to have some 
connections with others. “They have trust to start with…It’s the starting point that I trust 
you”, shared the entrepreneur. However, the issue is not the same outside Finland: “In most 
of the countries I think that you need to first build the trust…you need to invest a lot to 
build the trust”. The CEO also mentioned Russia as an example, where it is essential to 
initiate projects through the business leads whom the customers already trust. It looks like 
the network of experts – business leads – sales agents has been very important to Company 
E in overcoming this difference among cultures. (CEO E 2015) 
 
Another problem that was discussed by the CEO was customers’ habits in using this 
service. As explained, this is a kind of consulting service which is operated on a digital 
platform with experts all over the world. In other words, it is a totally new way of 
consuming consulting service. “There is of course lots of traditions of using consultants in 
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a traditional consulting way”, noted CEO E. It is a challenge for the company to recognize 
those customers who are willing to break the conventional way of working to do more with 
a virtual digital platform. He also added local competition as a challenge to the company, 
yet emphasized customers’ working traditions. This could possibly explain the free offering 
for the service’s first step where Company E would aim at proposing its customers to try. 
It is of course not easy to change people’s habits, which might require permanent 
commitment from the company. The entrepreneur also agreed that some physical presence 
in such markets is needed despite the digital channel. (CEO E 2015) 
 
In can be seen from this case that the sales agents have actually of great importance to the 
company’s business. These agents who are mostly local people in different countries do 
not only have connections in their home countries, thus could easily overcome the problem 
of trust. Moreover, they also understand very clearly the local way of working. Plus their 
good grasp of the business and its essence, it is highly likely that they can help change 
customers’ habits and successfully initiate projects. 
 
Global mindset 
CEO E is the founder and the CEO of Company E since 2013 when the company was 
officially established. Graduating from the master of science program in engineering at 
Aalto University School of Technology in 1994, his study focused on energy economics, 
with a minor in entrepreneurship and international marketing. The entrepreneur first started 
in a private engineering company providing energy efficiency services for real estate 
industry. He was in charge of developing new business for the company. After that he 
moved to work for a government-owned energy efficiency agency for five years, 
coordinating Finnish energy audit program with private consultants. The founder later 
worked for Finnpro (Finnish trade and investment promotion organization) in seven years 
helping Finnish small and medium sized companies to go international. Here he together 
with two of his colleagues who are now Company E’s co-founders invented the first version 
of Company E as a online consulting service in Cleantech Finland program in 2012. 
 
In further explanation of his experience at Finnpro, the CEO added that he had been mostly 
heading the sector of energy, environment and construction as well as logistics and 
machinery. Finnpro is really a global organization with its trade centers in roughly 50 
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different countries. During this time he already had many opportunities to work with 
experts from for instance Vietnam, China, or the US, who were consultants in these local 
markets that Finnish companies targeted. Until now when Company E has been in operation 
for two years, the entrepreneur shared that he still kept quite tight connections to those ex-
colleagues in different countries, not to mention Company E’s first customers were also 
related to this network of previous connections. Company E’s expert network was also 
partially built up through these connections, by references from people who already work 
as experts for the company. Consequently, it can be concluded that the entrepreneur had a 
broad international experience prior to the startup. (CEO E 2015) 
 
Regarding the direction that Company E is going, CEO E showed a strong determination 
of the goal that he aimed at. “We are making it international. It’s not anymore promoting 
Finnish technologies or Finnish companies but really trying to find the best solutions for 
the clients wherever the technology comes (from)…”, shared the entrepreneur. He 
emphasized that they had created a multidisciplinary network of experts with various types 
of expertise, from around 300 companies over 50 different countries. When it came to 
discussing difficulties with this diversity, the entrepreneur said: “I think it’s essential to 
understand, even though I don’t believe in stereotypes,…it’s important to understand the 
stereotypes…it helps you…to adapt…I don’t see that as a big obstacle”. In any case, the 
network indeed helped Company E with project initiation. Although this might have not 
been planned at the beginning of the startup, it appears that it was resulted from the 
founder’s prior international exposure and thus his familarity with diversity. (CEO E 2015) 
 
4.3. Summary of the empirical findings 
In this chapter, I have presented the findings on each single case company according to the 
themes in the theoretical framework. After each case was carefully examined, many 
commonalities of the case companies have emerged from the empirical findings. However, 
there are also a number of differences among the cases that need clarifying. In this sub-
chapter, I will provide a summary of these similarities and differences of the case 
companies. 
 
As regards the cases’ common patterns in entry mode choices, firstly, it is apparent that all 
the companies have employed at least 2 entry modes at the same time. Most of them had 
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their own offices in the foreign markets with their local employees. In addition, all the 
companies had contractual agreements with local partners. These people are any type of 
middlemen, who could be media partner, sales agents, or specialized experts. They act as 
the bridge of the case companies to their targeted markets. It should be noted that the 
companies started internationalizing very early in their businesses and in most cases, 
Finland is not their first market. Secondly, it is worth mentioning that no company uses 
equity joint venture for entering foreign markets. Thirdly, regarding cultural distance, all 
the CEOs thought that it was very natural for them to have their own offices or work with 
local agents, because the industry specific features required them to do so. Most of the 
CEOs even explicitly attributed their decisions to the nature of the products they provide. 
Specifically, it is either the universality or the knowledge-intensive feature of the products 
that led them to choose these entry modes. When asked, they all thought that the modes 
were helpful and there was no need to change. 
 
As for cultural distance and the global mindset, all the CEOs mentioned some of the cultural 
traits that drove their entry mode choice. These traits include language barrier, customers’ 
business working customs, trust and relationships. According to the CEOs, hiring local 
employees or cooperating with local agents helped them deal with these problems. All the 
CEOs had either worked in different countries or involved in international assignments in 
their past careers. All of them expressed very profound knowledge of multicultural business 
environment. Especially one of them even integrated this knowledge into his firm’s 
strategic development by building an international team of employees. 
 
The empirical findings also exhibit some inconsistencies among the cases. Firstly, although 
the companies have their own subsidiaries in foreign markets, the dynamics were not the 
same. For example, Company C’s office in Japan is working as an agent would do, i.e. a 
local agent (its Japanese co-founder) looking for sales. This is rather similar to Company 
A’s sales agent in Phillipines than a direct wholly-owned subsidiary. Meanwhile, Company 
D’s Indonesian office actually works as a representative office with all functions like 
quality assurance, customer care, and so on. Secondly, the companies’ internationalization 
processes were either gradual or accelerated. For instance, Company D first launched its 
product on app stores (direct export), then gradually increasing its resource commitment 
by working with local partners and a physical office. In contrast, Company B and Company 
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C just had office immediately in the US. Company C also had office in Japan. The next 
chapter is dedicated to discussing and explaining all the similarities and differences of the 
case companies that are presented in the empirical findings. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1. Cross-case analysis 
In the previous section, I have presented the information collected through interviews with 
the case companies. I also provided a within-case analysis for each case, following the 
theoretical structure proposed in the literature review. The data collected have shown many 
commonalities among the case companies, yet indicated a few differences that require 
further elaboration and explanation. In this section, I apply cross-case analysing techniques 
so as to focus on comparing the cases, thus roughly picturing the real-world decision 
making process for Finnish high-tech startups’ international entry modes. After arriving at 
this empirically based picture, I make a comparison with the predicted theoretical 
framework that I put forward in the literature review. Previous studiees and reasoning are 
employed to explain the comparison. 
 
5.1.1. International entry modes 
The entry modes that were used by the case companies are presented in Table 3 as follows. 
Table 3. Entry modes of the case companies 
Entry mode\Company A B C D E 
Export ✓ ✓ − − − 
Contractual agreement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Equity joint venture − − − − − 
Wholly-owned 
subsidiary 
− ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Firstly, it is apparent that all the case companies employed the contractual agreement mode. 
They all had agent agreements with local partners either to boost sales or to increase 
marketing activities. Indeed, this fact receives empirical support from extant research. 
Burgel and Murray (2000) studying European high-tech startups emphasizes that using 
middle man is the most frequently used entry method, together with export. The reasoning 
behind this choice is usually the intermediaries’ superior knowledge and network of 
relationships in the local markets (Burgel and Murray 2000). All the case companies in this 
research also demonstrated an incline to this reasoning for their choices. 
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Secondly, previous studies (Bell 1995, Burgel and Murray 2000) indicate that export is 
another most prefered method of entry by internationalizing high-tech startups. However, 
my research is at odds with this finding. Almost all of the case companies had 
representative offices or wholly-owned subsidiaries in the local markets, which implies 
even more committed resources into these foreign markets. This is probably explained by 
the complex features of the products that require prolonged sales cycle, intensive 
interaction with customers or maintenance phase.  Burgel and Murray (2000) also confirms 
that the product nature gradually leads to direct communication and frequent interaction 
between internationalizing high-tech startups and their customers. For example, Company 
A’s maintenance service which is particularly technical entails direct involvement of the 
company’s technical staff and close customer service for instructing customers if needed. 
Another example is Company D’s instant messaging service. This also requires timely 
responses to any requests from customers who are living a few time zones away. As a 
result, the companies need to be physically present to solve their customers’ problem 
without delay. At this point, this research is rather in line with Ojala (2007) researching on 
Finnish small and medium-sized software firms in Japan. 
 
In this research, only one company – Company A – went international with export and 
contractual agreement mode. This could be due to the industry specifics that required the 
company to present itself at the exhibitions and events of the industry worldwide and work 
with the customers directly, thus leading to export. Yet the 24/7 cloud service offering 
afterwards had largely saved the company time for direct meeting with foreign customers, 
hence there was not a need for physical office in the local markets any more. In other words, 
Company A’s internationalization and entry modes were also driven by the structure of the 
industry and the product itself. 
 
Thirdly, throughout all the cases, it appears that Finnish startups rather employ more than 
one entry mode at the same time for their business operations in one local market. More 
specifically, all the companies both approached their customers directly by themselves and 
went through local sales agents or partners. This research supports Perks (2009) concluding 
that European entrepreneurs prefer using a combination of some different entry modes to 
changing them linearly over their internationalization. Again, the cause is attributed to the 
specific requirements of the products/the industries or the local market dynamics/specific 
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cultural features: the Japanese market and the telecom industry required Company C to 
acquire relationships, the Filipino market and the financial industry forced Company A to 
have a local intermediary, the Indonesian market needed local people for the language and 
relationships, and so on. 
 
One outstanding point to notice is that the essence of using the entry modes are not similar 
throughout all the case companies. In other words, the names could be the same but the 
dynamics behind these modes could vary among the companies. For instance, most of the 
case companies had their physical offices in foreign markets but the offices’ roles in their 
overseas businesses are different. For Company D, the Indonesia office is not only for 
working with their local media partner but also for multiple functions such as customer 
care or quality assurance. Company D has two local employees who speak the local 
language and have the relationships. It makes sense that they can take more responsibilities 
for the business though all final decisions still remain reserved for the company 
headquarter. Company E is somewhat similar in the way its Slovakia office operates. 
Besides its “representative” function in the country, the office is also the centre for research 
and development of the company. Meanwhile, Company C has offices in Japan and the US, 
each run by a company’s employee. In Company C’s case, the CEO can be regarded as the 
company’s “local” employee due to his long working time in the local market and industry. 
The Japan office is run by the Japanese founder of the company. This physical presence is 
not much different from an agency if we consider the most part of its responsibility is 
selling by connecting with the industry’s intermediaries through personal relationships and 
contacts. 
 
Finally, it is apparent that no case company uses joint venture to enter their foreign markets. 
Pan and Tse (2000) in their research on firms’ entry modes suggest that the incentives that 
lead firms to choose wholly-owned subsidiaries over joint ventures come from micro-level 
firm-specific elements. Actually, many researchers have proved the failure of joint venture 
as an operation mode due to partners’ disagreements in economic motivations, sizes, 
technology transfer and so on (Vanhonacker 1997, Park and Ungson 1997). The case 
companies’ favor of wholly-owned subsidiaries over joint ventures can arise from one of 
such factors. It is easily noticed that all the case companies are engaged in knowledge-
intensive industry. It implies that product specifics play an important roles in their 
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businesses and are confidential. This feature certainly prevent a technology transfer process 
which might be inevitable in joint venture. This argument is supported in the interviews 
with CEO A, CEO C and CEO D. 
 
The internationalization process of the case companies is also worth mentioning. Across 
all the case companies, the first pattern emerging was that the accelerated approach applied 
to most cases in the very first period of internationalization. Indeed, the first fact proved 
this trend was that most of the companies did not have their first market in Finland. 
Company B and Company E had started in Finland but very soon expanded to other 
countries, the US and Slovakia respectively. Furthermore, despite their quick expansion 
abroad, their commitment towards overseas business were fairly high. Company A went 
with international exhibitions and did follow-ups by itself, yet later on had its local sales 
agent representing the company and working with customers in Phillipines. Company B 
and Company C had their own offices with own employees in the US. Company D started 
with partnership but now settled a physical presence in Indonesia. Company E presented 
its Slovakian office right at the beginning. It was obvious that all the companies invested 
plenty of their resources in broadening their business outside Finland from scratch. Data at 
this point prove that the accelerated approach could be the one favored by Finnish high-
tech startups. 
 
There are two motivations behind this fast and widespread expansion. First, it can be 
explained by the limited size of the Finnish market for the companies’ products. Bell (1995) 
studying Finnish small computer software firms concludes that their products fall into the 
knowledge intensive niche category. As a result, it goes without saying that large potential 
markets for the products, which do not often include Finland, become their destinations 
early in their business life. In this study, most of the case companies also happen to provide 
business to business solutions, except for Company D with the messaging app. Deals in 
this type of business in Finland can be even less promising in both quantity and value. All 
these things considered, there is evidence for their early fast committed 
internationalization. This point supports Ojala and Tyrväinen (2007) in concluding 
potential market size as a motivation for Finnish high-tech startups’ internationalization. 
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Another reason for this trend can be the specific structures of the industries. For Company 
A at first it was the online gaming industry around 2010. The industry functions in a quite 
different way from others in that it usually engages players vertically in the industry, 
regardless of their countries of origin. It thus made more sense for Company A to follow 
international events specifically held for the industry’s players than to focus on a rather 
limited number of online gaming companies in Finland. Or in the case of Company D, the 
inevitable was that the company launched the app on the global app stores. Consequently, 
there was a low chance that it would have “taken off” in Finland, considering a huge 
number of (mostly young) users who love instant messaging in Asia. For Company C, it 
was explicitly expressed that Japan was the must-go market for a telecom company due to 
its developed market structure and demand. At this point, this research is supported by 
Sousa and Bradley (2006), Brewer (2007) and Ojala (2008). Finnish high-tech startups can 
be said to adopt early vigorous internationalization due to the industries’ specific structure. 
 
However, data also indicate that the period of accelerated internationalization could 
probably be over for the case companies. They admitted that it was wise now that they 
stayed focused on a few selected markets due to scarce resources. Company A’s 
entrepreneur shared that it could have been a better approach if the company went more 
structuredly and strategically since the company’s resources were a bit scattered. Actually, 
Company D did apply this incremental internationalization in that they “exported” the app 
first through app stores, then partnered with local media to promote the app. When the 
number of customers sharply increased, they presented their customer care and product 
assurance in Indonesia physically. Company C strategically presented itself in Japan and 
the US, and kept focused on these two markets due to the markets’ importance in the 
industry. Company B did the same to the Northern European market and the US. Company 
E strongly relied on their business leads mostly in Finland and Central Europe, with 
reluctance to continue aggressive physical expansion in other countries. All emphasized 
that they now would want to go with clearer strategies in certain markets and less here-and-
there way of internationalizing. 
  
Up to this point, data show the intertwining of the accelerated and incremental approach in 
Finnish high-tech startups. This finding complies with the argument in the theoretical part 
of this study and supports findings of Perks (2009). Both approaches have been used by the 
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case companies in which period they helped with their business expansion and operation 
the most. During the first stage of expansion abroad, the companies could have been pushed 
to internationalize quickly for potential markets. Yet they are now slowed down by the 
limited resources that they possess in terms of time, financial strength and human resource. 
 
One more point that should be highlighted is that most of the case companies started their 
internationalization with their network of contacts in their previous international careers, 
as they mentioned. Just by switching the angle a bit, it was probably the network of previous 
contacts that led to the early and vigorous internationalization of the case companies. In 
this sense, this explanation conforms with Sharma and Blomstermo (2003) which studied 
Swedish high-tech startups’ internationalization.  
 
5.1.2. Cultural distance 
Firstly, all of the interviewees did not take cultural differences as a major problem in their 
international businesses. They gave the impression that the cultural features of the countries 
did not have much influence on their internationalization and entry mode decisions. This 
perceived immunity to cultural differences demonstrated by the entrepreneurs can be the 
result of their strong international exposure during the past working experience (Ojala and 
Tyrväinen 2009). It is highly likely that during the long time working internationally, the 
entrepreneurs have accumulated knowledge, developed their global mindset and thus 
shaped a new cognition process along the way (the entrepreneur’s global mindset is 
discussed in the next section). This could lead the entrepreneurs’ belief that their decisions 
on either the markets or the entry mode choices were very natural, without any cultural 
impact. In addition, it can also be because the strong bias toward the products’ nature and 
requirements that the national cultures’ importance and influence were largely undermined 
(Perks 2009). This somewhat “overlooked” effect of national cultures is proved to be 
present by the next two arguments. 
 
Secondly, the language barrier appears to be one of the obstacles nonetheless. Indeed, three 
out of five case companies mentioned the language barrier as the reason that they decided 
to have the local agents. Company A in Phillipines, Company D in Thailand and Indonesia, 
Company C in Japan, all of them relied much on their local agents who speak the local 
languages. To certain extent, language is one of several aspects of culture and it can cause 
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a leaning towards the entry modes that help overcome this barrier (Marcella, Davies and 
Williams 2002). This study in this point is at variance with Perks (2009). The language 
might not be a barrier to the case companies’ internationalization decisions but was a 
significant factor in their choices of entry mode.  
 
Thirdly, the problem of trust and relationship that exists in the local markets were also 
discussed by the interviewees. Company A encountered the language barrier and the trust 
issue in Phillipines, though this could be intensified by the sensitivity of the financial 
industry. Company C definitely experienced the language barrier in Japan where people do 
not speak excellent English, along with the relationship-favored working dynamics in the 
local market. Company E also relied on its strong network of business leads who acted as 
local agents of the company in order to overcome the trust issue. Finally, when asked if 
their operation modes helped with this problem, all interviewees indicated their 
satisfaction. It is apparent that this cultural specific characteristic had strongly influenced 
the case companies’ entry mode decisions into these foreign markets. 
Table 4. Cultural distance encountered by the case companies 
Company Aspects 
Company A Language 
Connection/Relationship 
Trust 
Company B Connection/Relationship 
Company C Language 
Connection/Relationship 
Trust 
Company D Language 
Connection/Relationship 
Company E Connection/Relationship 
Trust 
 
These problems regarding cultural traits of the local markets have led to the companies’ 
contractual agreements with their local agents, even when they have already had their own 
representative offices. This finding reveals that Finnish high-tech startups are subject to 
certain cultural traits as well, as acknowledged by Ojala and Tyrväinen (2009) which 
studies Finnish small and medium sized software firms. This argument also receives 
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empirical support from Dwyer, Mesak and Hsu (2005) which confirms the influence of 
national cultures on the product diffusion in cross-border business in European companies 
providing high technological innovations. The problems concerning cultures that the case 
companies have experienced in their internationalization are summarized in Table 4. 
 
5.1.3. The global mindset 
All the interviewees illustrated an expression of the global mindset. First thing to mention, 
all the CEOs have been doing business cross-border several times in their working histories. 
Some of them have even been engaged in international business throughout their past 
careers until the present moment (Company C, Company D, Company E). On average the 
CEOs had 12.6 years of running in international projects and business in which they worked 
with multidisciplinary and multicultural teams. While time could probably be a limited 
parameter for measuring the global mindset, Nummela, Saarenketo and Puumalainen 
(2004), studying over 100 small and medium-sized Finnish ICT companies, has confirmed 
the significant relationship between the manager’s international working experience and 
the global mindset. This result is supported by this research, regarding the CEOs’ broad 
knowledge of and detailed elaborations on cultures, as presented in the empirical findings 
part. 
 
However, knowledge could be seen as the display of the first aspect of the global mindset, 
which is manager’s awareness of multidimensional information in this diversified world. 
The next aspect of the global mindset illustrated by the interviewees was their articulation 
of the information, or interpretation. The CEOs shared that they all used to encounter 
conflicts in the international team they worked with yet none of them took that as a major 
problem. They thought that it was an inevitable part of diversity which exists to be adapted 
to, not to be scared of. 
 
The final and probably most important aspect of the global mindset is integration, meaning 
manager’s actions reflecting his information acquisition and interpretation. In this study, 
the integration was displayed in some cases quite obviously. The information gathered by 
the CEOs appears to have been translated into their actions or the companies’ strategies. 
Company D built its international team since the very beginning of its business and turned 
that into one of its key competitive advantages later on in the business. In a similar sense, 
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Company E started developing its network of international business leads as soon as the 
company was established and aimed to go global. Integration also came in the form of 
solving conflicts in a facilitating manner which was the approach Company A’s 
entrepreneur used in his working history. Company C’s entrepreneur based on his profound 
international working experience decided to keep the number of employees minimum and 
to develop its cooperation with agencies, thus increasing the overall efficiency. 
 
The evaluation of the interviewees’ global mindset can be summarized in Table 5 as 
follows. 
Table 5. The CEOs' global mindset 
Aspects Company 
A 
Company 
B 
Company 
C 
Company 
D 
Company 
E 
Openness and 
awareness 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Representation and 
articulation 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mediation and 
integration 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Manager’s global mindset did appear to play the facilitating role for the option of high-
committed entry modes in some cases. Ojala and Tyrväinen (2009) also highlight the 
importance of the manager towards entry mode choices, noting that his perception to the 
cultures and business environments leads to proper decisions of whether acquiring 
knowledge through hiring local employees or agents is necessary. In this study, the most 
persuasive case for this argument is Company D. The entrepreneur himself has long been 
working with international business assignments throughout his working history. He 
showed a good understanding of diversity thanks to his past experience working with 
international teams from Europe and Asia. This could have formed his cognitive process, 
from which he turned into a strategic decision for the company to build its own in-house 
international talent pool with over 10 nationalities. When Indonesia and the Asia Pacific 
market thrived, it came to the stage when Company D needed to develop its business there. 
First it was with the media partner for the marketing part of the business, next came the 
physical office in Indonesia. Besides the requirement from the business in the region, the 
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decision of having an office also sounded to make much sense since Company D had 
already got an Indonesian employee. Consequently, the decision became much smoother 
by just relocating the employee to the Indonesian office.  
 
5.2. Conclusions from cross-case analysis 
The above cross-case analysis was to compare all the cases studied and establish the 
generalization for Finnish high-tech startups in their internationalization and their choices 
of entry mode. Thereon I continued exploring the influence of cultural distance and the 
CEOs’ global mindset on entry mode choice. This sub-section is reserved to summarizing 
all the arguments presented and adjusting the theoretical framework proposed in the 
literature review part of the study. 
 
First, the case companies employed both equity and non-equity entry modes in their 
internationalization. To be exact, the combination of contractual agreement mode and own 
physical office mode was observed throughout almost all of the cases. This could be 
attributed to the lack of established relatioships with customers in the local markets (leading 
to using middle men) while still in need of direct and frequent communication with 
customers. This argument receives support from Burgel and Murray (2000), Ojala (2007) 
and Perks (2009). 
 
In 2012, the international orientation rate of the early-stage entrepreneurial activity in 
Finland was 21% which was higher than many other European countries’, including 
Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy and so on (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Data 
2012). The strong motivation to internationalize could be one of the reasons that make 
Finnish startups go global with higher commitment to foreign markets, especially for those 
with limited domestic market size like in high-tech industries. This number could also 
partially explain the internationalization pattern and entry mode choices of the case 
companies in this research. 
 
The case companies’ internationalization was an intertwinement of the incremental and 
accelerated internationalization approach. The accelerated approach was used due to the 
special structures of the industries that require the companies to reach their customers from 
other countries. It could probably also because of the limited market size in Finland. On 
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the other hand, the incremental approach was also recognized by the companies. This 
appears to be the result of startups’ scarce resources and the companies’ more developed 
strategies in their business. This point is in line with previous findings by Perks (2009). 
 
Second, cultural distance with language difference, the problem of trust and replationship 
appear to force the companies to work with local partners, i.e. using the entry mode of 
contractual agreement. These partners were sales agents or marketing promoters that helped 
the companies overcome the language barrier or the issue of trust or relationship. However, 
the influence of cultural distance was not recognized by the entrepreneurs, which could 
probably due to their long international working experience that led to the formation of 
their global mindset. This argument supports previous researches by Marcella, Davies and 
Williams (2002), Dwyer, Mesak and Hsu (2005), and Ojala and Tyrväinen (2009). 
However, it should be highlighted that large cultural distance did not necessarily lead to 
choosing export as an entry mode in the case companies. Instead, export mode was 
employed because of the product specifics or the characteristics of the industry, e.g. cyber 
security service or translation. 
 
Third, the CEOs’ global mindset was observed to make them opt for high control entry 
mode decisions. This influence could be either direct or indirect, in that the global mindset 
either directly led to the entry mode decision as it was the case of Company E, or facilitated 
the decision as in the case of Company D. Again, the CEOs perceived their decisions as a 
natural process due to the nature of the products or the industries’ requirements, which is 
also true in these cases. This finding is in line with the conclusions of Ojala and Tyrväinen 
(2009). It is also interesting to note that the CEOs’ global mindset did not lead to the choice 
of wholly owned subsidiary, but facilitated the decision. Instead, the subsidiary is formed 
due to the requirements of customer service or product specifics. 
 
Fourth, the empirical findings and cross-case analysis also indicate that the matter of 
cultural distance is not necessarily the commonly known differences between countries, i.e. 
at the macro level. Instead it should be seen as the manager’s cognition, or their perception 
of the cultures at the individual level in the light of their global mindset. In other words, 
manager’s global mindset could have more influence on the internationalization and entry 
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mode decisions than do national cultures. In this finding, my research shares the view with 
Sousa and Bradley (2006), Brewer (2007) and Ojala (2007). 
 
Fifth, there is one important pattern emerging that needs emphasizing. It is the fact that 
despite culturally distant markets, direct or equity modes were still favored by Finnish high-
tech startups. This was explained by the informants of my study as because of their 
products’ intensive knowledge nature that requires close customer interaction and support. 
Also, some special features of the industry with regard to market size or the way the 
industry runs have driven startups’ internationalization and entry mode choice. This 
argument is also supported by Ojala (2009) and Sharma and Blomstermo (2003). 
 
After concluding the cross-case analysis, I revise the original theoretical framework (Figure 
5) according to the empirical findings and present the revised theoretical framework in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Findings of the study 
 
The original theoretical framework (Figure 5) is partially supported with the empirical 
findings, in that cultural distance leads to the choice of contractual agreement (in all 5 
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cases), and the global mindset facilitates the choice of wholly owned subsidiary (in 4 out 
of 5 cases). Moreover, 3 particular aspects of cultures, i.e. language, relationship and trust, 
repeatedly emerged as the reasons for employing contractual agreement. At the same time, 
the global mindset was observed in all the CEOs, which was fully developed through their 
international work experience. The mindset either raised their confidence in their 
knowledge and abilities to self-run business overseas or resulted in their strategic decision 
for their business (like building international team or business leads). This finally resulted 
in the wholly owned subsidiary establishment. 
 
However, although cultural distance and the global mindset do have certain influence on 
the entry mode choice in Finnish high-tech startups, export mode and equity joint venture 
appear to be less relevant. To be specific, joint venture was not chosen for entering foreign 
markets by any of the case companies in my research. Export was used by 2 out of 5 
companies. However, this decision came from the companies’ industry and product 
specifics that allow them either to meet their customers easily or to operate without the 
need of face-to-face meeting. My research has come up with a finding about Finnish high-
tech startups’ product and industry specifics that partially influence the entry mode 
decision. This is also supported by previous research (Ojala 2009, Sharma and Blomstermo 
2003). 
  
  
89
6. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This chapter is dedicated to summarize the study findings and provide a picture of this 
thesis as a whole. The sudy’s theoretical and managerial implications are also discussed. In 
addition, a critical lens is used to reflect on the study’s limitations, thus suggesting research 
path for future researchers. 
 
6.1. Summary of the study 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this thesis is dedicated to identify the aspects of 
national cultures and the global mindset that influence Finnish high-tech startups’ 
international entry mode choice. Second, it is to understand the dynamics behind these 
infuences and describe them in detail through 5 cases.  
 
In order to accomplish these two purposes, I have started my research with a review of 
existing theories and concepts that are relevant to the research problem. Using the lens of 
the multiple cultures perspective, I have kept cultural distance and the global mindset at an 
individual level and studied the perception and knowledge of Finnish high-tech startups’ 
CEOs about this. Due to a rather limited amount of researches regarding Finnish high-tech 
startups, I have extended my review to a wider range, for example researches on traditional 
and small and medium sized firms’ internationalization and entry modes. According to 
many researches, cultural distance between countries poses more risks to foreign market 
entry, thus drives firms’ CEOs to low resource committed and low control entry modes. On 
the other hand, the global mindset increases CEOs’ confidence in their abilities, thus makes 
them commit to high control modes. From this review, I have developed a preliminary 
theoretical framework for my study. The purpose of this framework, however, is not to 
provide a rigid anticipation of the study results. Instead, it is more like a summary of the 
literature review, which I tried to keep flexible and subject to changes after the interviews 
with the CEOs. 
 
After that, I explained in detail the methodology and method of my study, which is a 
multiple case study research conducted in 5 Finnish high-tech startups. The empirical data 
of this study were collected partially through the case companies’ websites and blogs and 
mostly by semi-structured thematic interviews. The interviewees were the CEOs of the case 
companies. Totally 5 interviews were conducted, 3 face-to-face and 2 via video 
conferencing. The interviews were all recorded with the interviewees’ permission, listened 
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to twice and transcribed verbatim without using any software. All the transcriptions were 
treated confidential, with only the interviewer’s access. The collected information was 
interpreted through a systematic process, using 2 different analysis techniques of within-
case and cross-case analysis. 
 
The study’s empirical findings illustrated many similarities with previous literature (Ojala 
2007, Ojala and Tyrväinen 2009, Perks 2009). The data show that Finnish high-tech 
startups start internationalizing very early in their businesses and tend to employ high 
control entry modes overseas like wholly owned subsidiary. Moreover, they usually 
employ 2 to 3 entry modes, even at the same time. This study findings indicate that Finnish 
high-tech startups’ entry mode choice is also subject to the influence of cultural distance as 
traditional small and medium sized companies are (Freeman and Cavusgil 2007, López-
Duarte and Vidal-Suárez 2010). Particularly, cultural differences regarding language, 
relationship and trust issue have led Finnish high-tech startups to opt for agent contractual 
agreement as a solution. However, this influence is partially countered by the presence of 
the global mindset of the entrepreneurs, which enables them to establish wholly owned 
subsidiary in perceived culturally distant markets. This finding in Finnish high-tech 
startups’ entrepreneurs shares the view with normal small firms’ managers with 
international experiences (Nielsen and Nielsen 2011; Kyvik et al. 2013; Hsu, Chen and 
Cheng 2013). 
 
However, a few differences with previous research were also discussed. Contrary to what 
prior literature might suggest when it comes to a culturally distant market (Kogut and Singh 
1988, Brouthers 2002), Finnish high-tech startups seem not prefer joint venture but go for 
a higher control level mode – wholly onwed subsidiary – in their international operations. 
This might be explained by the knowledge intensivity of the products. Usually, high-tech 
startups develop their business in a niche market with leading edge products, which requires 
a certain degree of confidentiality. Therefore, joint venture might not be appropriate. In 
addition, two new factors were mentioned as of great importance to Finnish high-tech 
startups’ internationalization, i.e. product and industry specific. Industry specific requires 
firms to go to a certain market for the market’s size and development, for example, 
telecommunications in Japan. Product specific requires firms to be present to deliver high-
quality service, thus leads to the choice of own representative office with own employees. 
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However, these factors’ influences on startups’ entry mode choice still need further 
research and elaborations. 
 
6.2. Theoretical and managerial implications 
This study has contributed to the existing theories in two ways. Firstly, by using extant 
researches on firms’ internationalization and entry modes as a guideline, my study has 
evaluated the literature’s applicability in explaining the entry mode decision in the context 
of Finnish high-tech startups. Although very few pieces of research on Finnish high-tech 
startups was found, I have built up my own theoretical framework basing on relevant 
previous literature. The study results show that theories and concepts on traditional firms’ 
internationalization and entry modes have laid profound grounds for investigating and 
understanding Finnish high-tech startups’. Despite some differences identified, my study 
proves that Finnish high-tech startups’ internationalization and mode choices still follow 
certain patterns that were found in traditional small firms before. Secondly, this study 
contributes to creating a base for future research on the phenomenon of high-tech startup’s 
entry modes in foreign markets. This study findings have shown that the nature of high-
tech startups’ products and industries plays very important roles in their 
internationalization. This study thus opens up a few topics for further studies related to 
Finnish high-tech startups’ international operations. 
 
The managerial implications of this study are fourfold. Firstly, this study shows that high-
tech startups are still subject to the influence of cultural distance. The study findings 
indicate that such factors as language, local working customs and local preferences of 
relationships are of great importance to the success in firm’s operation in foreign markets. 
Understanding and evaluating own firms’ capabilities regarding these factors can also help 
managers make better-informed decisions on entry in the markets. Secondly, CEO’s or 
management team’s global mindset can be of great benefit for high-tech startups in 
countering the influence of cultural distance on firm’s entry mode decision. Beyond that, 
CEO with the global mindset can have strategic decisions that will facilitate firm’s 
international operation in the long run. Thirdly, although this study does not suggest that 
all startups use contractual agreements and wholly-owned subsidiaries for foreign entries, 
there are some implications to be realized. As regards startups’ limited resources, especially 
financially, contractual agreement with agent can be helpful to save resources and to enter 
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foreign market effectively. Finally, the findings suggest that even though high-tech startups 
are forced to go international due to market size, product specifics, etc., it is still essential 
that a careful implementation plan is developed. This plan is regarding not only how to 
enter foreign markets but also which markets to choose, which entry mode for each market, 
and so on. This is to avoid scattering all the limited resources that startup companies possess. 
 
6.3. Limitations 
Despite careful design and execution, this study still has three limitations. Firstly, the 
generalizability of the study is rather limited. The research and analysis are only conducted 
on Finnish high-tech startups. It implies that within the context of similar Finnish high-tech 
startups the study findings are generalizable. The review of previous literature and the 
results indicate that some patterns in small and medium sized firms are also shared by 
Finnish high-tech startups. However, in other context than this, for example startups in 
other sectors or in other countries, the conclusions from this study should be evaluated with 
caution. Secondly, this study is conducted by a researcher who is not Finnish. All the 
reviewed researches and the interviews can only be in English. This means that the 
researcher may not be able to access a number of researches on the research problem that 
are in Finnish. The interviews in English which is not the interviewees’ native language 
might also influence the collected data. Finally, potential biases are inevitable since the 
researcher designed, conducted the study and analyzed the data herself. This should be 
taken into consideration in using this study results. 
 
6.4. Suggestions for future research 
As introduced at the beginning of this thesis, very few researches on high-tech startups’ 
internationalization and entry mode choice is found. Therefore, along with its contributions 
to this area, this study also opens up some directions for future research. Firstly, it is 
illustrated in this study that Finnish high-tech startups’ mode choice is not only influenced 
by cultural distance and the global mindset. Two very important factors that are mentioned 
are industry specific and product specific. The limited scope of this study has not allowed 
lengthy data collection and elaborations on these two factors. However, this can be a 
propective area for future studies. Secondly, this study is a qualitative research which leans 
more towards theory building and exploring new patterns in Finnish high-tech startups’ 
foreign entries. Further research can therefore be designed as quantitative research so as to 
verify the validity of this study findings. Finally, researchers can conduct future studies on 
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the same problem in different contexts, for example startups’ entry mode choice in the 
context of other industries or in other countries. After that they can compare their results 
with this study in order to provide a better picture of startups’ business operations.  
  
  
94
7. REFERENCES 
Anderson, E. and Gatignon, H. (1986). Modes of foreign entry: A transaction cost analysis 
and propositions. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 17 No. 3, 1-26. 
Barkema, H. G., Bell, J. H. and Pennings, J. M. (1996) Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and 
learning. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17 No. 2, 151-166. 
Barkema, H. G. and Vermeulen, F. (1998). International expansion through startup or 
acquisition: A learning perspective. Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41 No. 
1, 7–26.  
Bell, J. (1995). The internationalization of small computer software firms: A further 
challenge to “stage” theories. European journal of marketing, Vol. 29 No. 8, 60-75. 
Bilkey, W. J., & Tesar, G. (1977). The export behavior of smaller-sized Wisconsin 
manufacturing firms. Journal of international business studies, Vol. 8 No. 1, 93-98. 
Blank, S.G. and Dorf, B. (2012). The startup owner's manual: The step-by-step guide for 
building a great company. K&S Ranch, Incorporated. 
Brewer, P. A. (2007). Operationalizing psychic distance: A revised approach. Journal of 
International Marketing, Vol. 15 No. 1, 44-66. 
Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry 
mode choice and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 33 
No. 2, 203-221. 
Brouthers, K. D. and Nakos, G. (2004). SME entry mode choice and performance: A 
transaction cost perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 28 Issue 3, 
229-247. 
Brouthers, K. D. and Brouthers, L. E. (2001). Explaining the national cultural distance 
paradox. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 32 No. 1, 177-189. 
Burgel, O. and Murray, G. C. (2000). The international market entry choices of startup 
companies in high-technology industries. Journal of International Marketing, Vol. 8 
No. 2, 33-62. 
Cannone, G. and Ughetto, E. (2014). Born globals: A cross-country survey on high-tech 
startups. International Business Review, Vol. 23 No. 1, 272-283. 
Chetty, S. and Campbell-Hunt, C. (2004). A strategic approach to internationalization: A 
traditional versus a “born-global” approach. Journal of International Marketing, Vol. 
12 No. 1, 57-81. 
  
  
95
Coviello, N.E. and Jones, M.V. (2004). Methodological issues in international 
entrepreneurship research. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 19 Issue 4, 485-508. 
Coviello, N.E., McDougall, P.P. and Oviatt, B.M. (2011). The emergence, advance and 
future of international entrepreneurship research – An introduction to the special 
forum. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 26 Issue 6, 625-631. 
Dow, D. (2000). A note on psychological distance and export market selection. Journal of 
International Marketing, Vol. 8 Issue 1, 51-64. 
Dwyer, S., Mesak, H. and Hsu, M. (2005). An exploratory examination of the influence of 
national culture on cross-national product diffusion. Journal of International 
Marketing, Vol. 13 No. 2, 1-28. 
Efrat, K. and Shoham, A. (2013). The interaction between environment and strategic 
orientation in born globals’ choice of entry mode. International Marketing Review, 
Vol. 30 No. 6, 536-558. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 14 No. 4, 532-550. 
Eriksson, P. and Kovalainen, A. (2008). Qualitative methods in business research. SAGE 
Publications. 
Erramilli, M. K. (1996). Nationality and subsidiary ownership patterns in multinational 
corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 27 No. 2, 225-248. 
Erramilli, M. K. and Rao, C. P. (1993), Service firms’ international entry mode choice: A 
modified transaction cost approach, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 57 No. 3, 19-38. 
Evans, J., Treadgold, A. and Mavondo, F. (2000). Explaining export development through 
psychic distance. International Marketing Review, Vol. 17 Issue 2, 164-169. 
Fan, T. and Phan, P. (2007). International new ventures: revisiting the influences behind 
the “born-global” firm. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 38 No. 7, 
1113-1131. 
Fang, T. (2003). A critique of Hofstede’s fifth national culture dimension. International 
Journal of Cross Cultural Management, Vol. 3 No. 3, 347-368. 
Fletcher, M. and Plakoyiannaki, E. (2011). Case selection in international business: key 
issues and common misconceptions. In Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (Eds). Rethinking 
the case study in International Business and Management Research. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
  
  
96
Freeman, S. and Cavusgil, S. T. (2007). Toward a typology of commitment states among 
managers of born-global firms: A study of accelerated internationalization. Journal 
of International Marketing, Vol. 15 No. 4, 1-40. 
Gabrielsson, M. and Pelkonen, T. (2008). Born internationals: Market expansion and 
business operation mode strategies in the digital media field. Journal of International 
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 6 Issue 2, 49-71. 
Ghauri, P. (2004). Designing and conducting case studies in International Business 
research. In Marschan-Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (Eds.). Handbook of qualitative 
research methods for international business. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Data (2012). Available at 
http://www.gemconsortium.org/data/key-indicators <Accessed on 11th December 
2015>. 
Gupta, A.K. and Govindarajan, V. (2002). Cultivating a global mindset. Academy of 
Management Executive, Vol. 16 No. 1, 116-126. 
Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997), “Revision of the High- Technology Sector and Product 
Classification”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 1997/02, 
OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/134337307632 
Herrmann, P. and Datta, D. K. (2006). CEO experiences: Effects on the choice of FDI entry 
mode. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 43 No. 4, 755-778. 
Hessels, J. and Terjesen, S. (2010). Resource dependency and institutional theory 
perspectives on direct and indirect export choices. Small Business Economics, Vol. 
34 Issue 2, 203-220. 
Hofstede, G. (1983). National cultures in four dimensions: A research-based theory of 
cultural differences among nations. International Studies of Management and 
Organization, Vol. 8 No. 1-2, 46-74. 
Hofstede, G. (1989). Organising for cultural diversity. European Management Journal, 
Vol. 7 No. 4, 390–397.  
Hofstede, G. (2006). What did GLOBE really measure? Researchers’ minds versus 
respondents’ minds. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 37 No. 6, 882-
896. 
Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. (1997). Active Interviewing. In Silverman, D. (Eds.) 
Qualitative Research. Theory, Method and Practice. Sage, London.  
  
  
97
Holtbrügge, D. and Berg, N. (2004), Knowledge transfer in multinational corporations: 
Evidence from German firms, Management International Review, Special Issue Vol. 
44 No. 3, 129-145. 
Hsu, W. T., Chen, H. L. and Cheng, C. Y. (2013). Internationalization and firm 
performance of SMEs: The moderating effects of CEO attributes. Journal of World 
Business, Vol. 48 No. 1, 1-12. 
Hutchinson, K., Alexander, N., Quinn, B. and Doherty, A. M. (2007). Internationalization 
motives and facilitating factors: qualitative evidence from smaller specialist retailers. 
Journal of International Marketing, Vol. 15 Issue 3, 96-122. 
Javidan, M., House, R. J., Dorfman, P. W., Hanges, P. J. and de Luque, M. S. (2006). 
Conceptualizing and measuring cultures and their consequences: A comparative 
review of GLOBE's and Hofstede's approaches. Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 37 No. 6, 897-914. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.E. (1977). The internationalization process of the firm-a model 
of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 8 No. 1, 23-32.  
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J.E. (2009). The Uppsala internationalization process model 
revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 40 No. 9, 1411-1431. 
Jolly, V.K., Alahuhta, M. and Jeannet, J.P. (1992). Challenging the incumbents: How high 
technology start- ups compete globally. Strategic Change, Vol. 1 No. 2, 71-82. 
Jones, M.V., Coviello, N. and Tang, Y.K. (2011). International Entrepreneurship research 
(1989-2009): A domain ontology and thematic analysis. Journal of Business 
Venturing. Vol. 26, 632-659. 
Kane, T. (2010). Kauffman foundation research series: Firm formation and economic 
growth – The importance of startups in job creation and job destruction. Ewing 
Marion Kauffman Foundation. Available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20c
overs/2010/07/firm_formation_importance_of_startups.pdf <Accessed on 19th 
March 2015> 
Kedia, B.L. and Mukherji, A. (1999). Global managers: Developing a mindset for global 
competitiveness. Journal of World Business, Vol. 34 No. 2, 230-251. 
  
  
98
Keupp, M.M. and Gassmann, O. (2009). The past and the future of international 
entrepreneurship: A review and suggestions for developing the field. Journal of 
Management, Vol. 35 No. 3, 600-633. 
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 19 No. 3, 411-432. 
Kuivalainen, O., Saarenketo, S. and Puumalainen, K. (2012). Start-up patterns of 
internationalization: A framework and its application in the context of knowledge-
intensive SMEs. European Management Journal, Vol. 30 No. 4, 372-385. 
Kuivalainen, O., Sundqvist, S., Saarenketo, S. and McNaughton, R. (2012). 
Internationalization patterns of small and medium-sized enterprises. International 
Marketing Review, Vol. 29 Issue 5, 448-465. 
Kyvik, O., Saris, W., Bonet, E. and Felício, J. A. (2013). The internationalization of small 
firms: The relationship between the global mindset and firms’ internationalization 
behavior. Journal of International Entrepreneurship, Vol. 11 No. 2, 172-195. 
Levy, O., Beechler, S, Taylor, S. and Boyacigiller, N.A. (2007). What we talk about when 
we talk about ‘Global mindset’: Managerial cognition in multinational corporations. 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 38 No. 2, 231-258. 
Luo, Y. and Shenkar, O. (2006). The multinational corporation as a multilingual 
community: Language and organization in a global context. Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol. 37 No. 3, 321-339. 
Luostarinen, R. and Gabrielsson, M. (2006). Globalization and marketing strategies of born 
globals in SMOPECs. Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 48 No. 6, 
773-801. 
Luostarinen, R., Korhonen, H., Jokinen J. and Pelkonen T. (1994). Globalisation and SME: 
globalization of economic activities and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
development, Finland. Helsinki: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Business 
Development Department. 
Madsen, T.K. and Servais, P. (1997). The internationalization of born globals: An 
evolutionary process? International Business Review, Vol. 6 No. 6, 561-583. 
Marschan, R., Welch, D. and Welch, L. (1997). Language: The forgotten factor in 
multinational management. European Management Journal, Vol. 15 Issue 5, 591-
598. 
  
  
99
Marschan-Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (2004). Qualitative research methods in International 
Business: The state of the art. In Marschan-Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (Eds.). 
Handbook of qualitative research methods for international business. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
McDougall, P.P. (1989). International versus domestic entrepreneurship: new venture 
strategic behavior and industry structure. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 4 No. 
6, 387-400. 
McDougall, P.P., Covin, J.G., Robinson, R.B. and Herron, L. (1994). The effects of 
industry growth and strategic breadth on new venture performance and strategy 
content. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 No. 7, 537-554. 
McDougall, P.P. and Oviatt, B.M. (2000). International Entrepreneurship: The intersection 
of two research paths. Academy of Management, Vol. 43 No 5, 902-906. 
Melén, S. and Nordman, E. R. (2009). The internationalization modes of Born Globals: A 
longitudinal study. European Management Journal, Vol. 27 Issue 4, 243-254. 
Miocevic, D. and Crnjak-Karanovic, B. (2012). Global mindset – A cognitive driver of 
small and medium-sized enterprise internationalization. EuroMed Journal of 
Business, Vol. 7 Issue 2, 142-160. 
Nakos, G. and Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Entry mode choice of SMEs in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 27 Issue 1, 47-63. 
Nielsen, B. B. and Nielsen, S. (2011). The role of top management team international 
orientation in international strategic decision-making: The choice of foreign entry 
mode. Journal of World Business, Vol. 46 No.2, 185-193. 
Nummela, N., Saarenketo, S. and Puumalainen, K. (2004). A global mindset – A 
prerequisite for successful internationalization? Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, Vol. 21 No. 1, 51-64. 
OECD (2011). ISIC Rev. 3 Technology Intensity Definition. OECD Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry. Economic Analysis and Statisctics Division. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf <Accessed on 7th April 
2015>. 
OECD Observer (2000). Small and medium-sized enterprises: local strength, global reach. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/regional/leed/1918307.pdf <Accessed on 19th 
March 2015> 
  
  
100
Ojala, A. (2007).  Entry in a psychically distant market: Finnish small and medium-sized 
software firms in Japan. European Management Journal, Vol. 26 Issue 2, 135-144. 
Ojala, A. (2009). Internationalization of knowledge-intensive SMEs: The role of network 
relationships in the entry to a psychically distant market. International Business 
Review, Vol. 18 No. 1, 50-59. 
Ojala, A. and Tyrväinen, P. (2007). Market entry and priority of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the software industry: An empirical analysis of cultural distance, 
geographic distance, and market size. Journal of International Marketing, Vol. 15 
No. 3, 123-149. 
Oviatt, B.M. and McDougall, P.P. (1994). Toward a theory of international new ventures. 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, 45-64. 
Oviatt, B.M. and McDougall, P.P. (1997). Challenges for internationalization process 
theory: The case of international new ventures. MIR: Management International 
Review, Vol. 37, 85-99. 
Oviatt, B.M. and McDougall, P.P. (2005). Defining international entrepreneurship and 
modeling the speed of internationalization. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 29 No. 5, 537-554. 
Pan, Y. and Tse, D. K. (2000). The hierarchical model of market entry modes. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 31 No. 4, 535-554. 
Park, S. H. and Ungson, G. R. (1997). The effect of national culture, organizational 
complementarity, and economic motivation on joint venture dissolution. The 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40 No. 2, 279-307. 
Perks, K. J. (2009). Influences on international market entry method decisions by European 
entrepreneurs. International Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 13 No. S1, 1-20. 
Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (2011). Pluralisim in international business and international 
management research: making the case. In Piekkari, R. and Welch, C. (Eds). 
Rethinking the case study in International Business and Management Research. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Rialp, A., Rialp, J., Urbano, D. and Vaillant, Y. (2005). The born-global phenomenon: A 
comparative case study research. Journal of International Entrepreneurship, Vol. 3 
No. 2, 133-171. 
Rennie, M.W. (1993). Born global. The McKinsey Quarterly, Vol. 4, 45-52. 
  
  
101
Ripollés, M., Blesa, A. and Monferrer, D. (2012). Factors enhancing the choice of higher 
resource commitment entry modes in international new ventures. International 
Business Review, Vol. 21 No. 4, 648-666. 
Ronen, S. and Shenkar, O. (1985). Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: a review 
and synthesis. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 10 No. 3, 435-454. 
Roth, M. S. (1995). The effects of culture and socioeconomics on the performance of global 
brand image strategies. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 32 No. 2, 163–175.  
Rouddini, A. and Osman, M.H.M. (2012). Globalization, international entrepreneurship 
(IE) and their effect on the world of business. Asean Entrepreneurship Conference 
2012. 57-63. 
Sackmann, S. A. and Phillips, M. E. (2004). Contextual influences on culture research 
shifting assumptions for new workplace realities. International Journal of Cross 
Cultural Management, Vol. 4 No. 3, 370-390. 
Shane, S. (1994). The effect of national culture on the choice between licensing and direct 
foreign investment. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 No. 8, 627-642. 
Shenkar, O. (2012), Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous conceptualization 
and measurement of cultural differences, Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol. 43 Issue 1, 1-11. 
Sousa, C. M. P. and Bradley, F. (2006). Cultural distance and psychic distance: Two peas 
in a pod? Journal of International Marketing, Vol. 14 No. 1, 49-70. 
Sousa, C. M. P. and Bradley, F. (2008). Cultural distance and psychic distance: refinements 
in conceptualisation and measurement, Journal of Marketing Management, Vol. 24 
No. 5-6, 467-488. 
Stake, R. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, Sage.  
Steenhuis, H. and Bruijn, E. J. (2006). High technology revisited: definition and position. 
International Conference on Management of Innovation and Technology, IEEE (21-
23 June 2006). 
Stenholm, P. Suomalainen, S., Kovalainen, A., Heinonen, J. and Pukkinen, T. (2013). 
Global entrepreneurship monitor (GEM) – Finnish 2013 report. Turku School of 
Economics, University of Turku, TSE Entre. Available at 
http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/3445 <Accessed on 20th March 2015> 
  
  
102
Stöttinger, B. and Schelgelmilch, B. B. (1998). Explaining export development through 
psychic distance: enlightening or elusive?, International Marketing Review, Vol. 15 
Issue 5, 357-372. 
Tihanyi, L., Griffith, D. A. and Russell, C. J. (2005). The effect of cultural distance on entry 
mode choice, international diversification, and MNE performance: A meta-analysis. 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 36 No. 3, 270-283. 
Vanhonacker, W. (1997). Entering China: An unconventional approach. Harvard Business 
Review. Vol. 75 Issue 2, 130-140. 
Weerawardena, J., Mort, G.S., Liesch, P.W. and Knight, G. (2007). Conceptualizing 
accelerated internationalization in the born global firm: A dynamic capabilities 
perspective. Journal of World Business, Vol. 42 No. 3, 294-306. 
Welch, L.S., Benito, G.R. and Petersen, B. (2008). Foreign operation methods: Theory, 
analysis, strategy. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Yagi, N. and Kleinberg, J. (2011). Boundary work: An interpretive ethnographic 
perspective on negotiating and leveraging cross-cultural identity. Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 42 No. 5, 629-653. 
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case study research design and methods third edition. Applied social 
research methods series, Vol. 5. 
Zahra, S. A. (1993). A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior: A critique 
and extension. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 17 No. 4, 5-21. 
Zahra, S.A. and George, G. (2002). International entrepreneurship: The current status of 
the field and future research agenda. Strategic entrepreneurship: Creating a new 
mindset, 255-288. 
  
  
103
8. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interview guide 
Theme 1: Background information of the interviewee 
• Title, working history, current position 
Theme 2: Development of the company 
• Establishment time, first market 
• Development process 
Theme 3: Internationalization 
• Current markets 
• Entry modes, reasons 
Theme 4: National culture differences between markets 
• Differences, problems 
• Entry modes’ effect 
Theme 5: The entrepreneur’s global mindset 
• International working experience 
• Current employees, partners/subcontractors 
Theme 6: Other issues 
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Appendix 2: Recording consent form and statements 
Recording consent form 
Thank you for participating in my research of factors influencing Finnish high-tech start-
ups’ international entry modes. 
I will be recording our interview session to write my research report. Please read the 
statement below and sign where indicated. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, 
and you may discontinue the interview at any time. The interview will take about 40-60 
minutes. 
The information that you provide during the interview will be treated confidentially. 
Findings of the interviews will be included in my research report and will be sent to you and 
submitted to Professor Lu Wei only. 
If you have any questions regarding the informed consent or the research project, please do 
not hesitate to contact me: 
Researcher’s name: Hang Pham   
Email: hang.pham@aalto.fi    Telephone: +358 46 5245136   
In advance many thanks for your help! 
With best wishes, 
(Signed) 
Hang Pham 
Participant’s statement 
I have read the above explanation and I agree to participate in the interview. I understand that 
my participation is voluntary, and that I may discontinue my participation at any time. 
[    ]  I give permission that the findings of this interview can be included in Ms. Hang 
Pham’s research report. This report will be submitted to Professor Lu Wei only. 
[    ] I give permission to Ms. Hang Pham to provide a summary of their findings in class. 
This summary will include no information that would make it possible to identify me. 
[    ] I give permission to Ms. Hang Pham to record the interview, with the understanding 
that the recording will not be passed on to or otherwise shared with third parties. 
If you would like to receive a copy of the report, please indicate that here: 
 [    ] I would like to receive a copy of the report. Please send it to me as digital/paper copy 
to this address (email or postal): 
Participant’s name: _________________________________________ 
Participant’s signature: ____________________ Date: _____________ 
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Researcher’s statement 
I have explained the purpose of this interview to Mr./Ms. ______________, and he/she has 
consented to participate. 
Researcher’s name: _______________________________________________     
Researcher’s signature: __________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
